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SYNOPSIS 
The General Strike of 1917 began on the 2nd of August in the 
workshops of the New South Wales Railways and Tramways Department on 
the introduction of the Card System into the Service. Although the dis-
pute was confined to the Department initially, it quickly spread by way 
of "sympathy" strikes to include unionists in all major industries in 
the State, and the major ports of the Commonwealth. Through the use of 
volunteer and "loyalist" labour and the assistance of the Federal Govern-
ment and the employers, the Nationalist Government of New South Wales 
was able to defeat the strikers and impose harsh settlements. The rail-
way section of the strike ended on the 10th September, but coalminers, 
seamen and watersiders did not return to work until mid-October. 
The Nationalist Government of New South Wales was quick to brand 
the strike a political "conspiracy", which set out to challenge the 
authority of the recently elected "win-the-war" Nationalist Government. 
It was alleged by the Nationalists that the conspiracy had been initiated 
by the revolutionary I.W.W. and supported by all dissident and disloyal 
elements of the labour movement, who had opposed conscription and were 
intent on thwarting the war effort. These sentiments were echoed by the 
patriotic press and endorsed by W.M. Hughes and the Nationalists in 
power in the Federal Parliament. The Nationalists, to crush the Conspiracy, 
and to assert the authority of their Government, set out to defeat the 
unions totally and unconditionally. 
Allegations that the strike was the result of a political conspiracy 
within the labour movement were without foundation. Amongst trade unionists 
there was much discontent, as real wages fell and prices soared and other 
grievances remained unheard. The Card System was merely a catalyst for 
direct action, since it created fears of impending deterioration in 
XXI. 
working conditions and further exploitation of labour. Provocative 
actions on the part of the Nationalist Government provided further fuel 
for a potentially volatile industrial situation. 
Counter-allegations were made by members of the labour movement to 
the effect that the Nationalists, together with employers, had deliberately 
engineered the strike to launch an attack on unionism. Certainly, in 
the violation of written agreements, first the Government and then the 
employers engaged in wholesale victimisation, refusing to re-employ 
workers in their old jobs and depriving them of their seniority and super-
annuation rights. Old unions were de-registered and new Government or 
employer-sponsored unions created in their place. In a later Royal 
Commission, several of the actions of the Government of New South Wales 
were found to be legally questionable. However, the notion of "conspiracy" 
remains tenuous. 
The evidence shows that the Nationalists and the employers effected 
a savage attack on unionism, and the success of this probably influenced 
the decision to hold another Conscription Referendum. Whether or not 
this was a pre-meditated attack or, in fact, a conspiracy, is difficult 
to prove conclusively. 
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1. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Prologue to the Strike 
On the 2nd August 1917, several thousand employees of the New South 
Wales Railways and Tramways Department laid down their tools and walked 
off the job at the Randwick Depot in Sydney. Thus began one of the most 
disastrous strikes in the State's history, one which came close to 
paralyzing the whole of New South Wales and also many services throughout 
the Commonwealth. E. J. Kavanagh, secretary of the New South Wales 
Labour Council, described the strike as "The biggest upheaval ever 
experienced in Australia". The reason for the initial stoppage was the 
introduction, without due notice, of the so-called "Card System", a 
system which the Railway Commissioners claimed was simply an improved 
costing system, needed to provide information about the cost of running 
2 
the service. The men believed that the system was the Taylor Card 
System, a system which caused "speeding-up" and was repudiated by trade 
3 
unionists in the United States. The introduction of the time cards 
affected, at least initially, only a few thousand members of the A.S.E. 
The strike spread to include members of other railway unions, and then 
to unionists in other industries throughout the Commonwealth. Most 
workers stopped in S5rmpathy with the railway men, whilst others were 
drawn into the dispute by refusing to handle "black" goods and coal. 
The strike was settled in two stages. The railway men negotiated their 
settlement on the 8th September, and the remaining of the strikers 
returned some weeks later. 
1. Labour Council of New South Wales, Report, 31st December, 1917 p.l 
2. ibid, p.l 
3. ibid, p.l 
4. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour and Industrial 
Bganch Report No. 8, July 1918, p. 121. For further details of i-h. 
of the spread of the strike, see Chapter 4 ^^^^er aetaxls of the 
In all, the strike involved about 97,500 workers in Australia, but 
the bulk of these - some 77.350 - were in New South Wales, which was the 
centre of the strike. Similarly, the total loss of wages was £2,233,000; 
the New South Wales figure being £1,780,000 and the total loss of working 
5 
days was 3,982,250, the loss in New South Wales being about 3,071,000. 
Clearly then, while the strike did spread throughout Australia, New South 
Wales was very much the centre, and it is on events in New South Wales 
that this paper will concentrate. 
The response of the New South Wales Nationalist Government was to 
brand the strike as a conspiracy. This sentiment was echoed by others 
in the country. Hughes, the Prime Minister, called the strike "the fruits 
of a deliberate conspiracy". Various employer organisations and the 
press supported the Nationalist Government of New South Wales in its 
denunciations of the strike. The Sydney Morning Herald, for example, 
argued that the strike was 
"a conspiracy against the State, in the first instance; and 
coming in time of war, when co-operation and hearty goodwill 
are essential to our taking a fair share of the fighting, it 
becomes a conspiracy against the Empire". 
The Employers' Federation deplored 
"the action of the Unions in precipitating an unjustifiable 
strike upon such an issue when the Empire is engaged in a 
life and death struggle for the preservation of our 
liberties".8 
The Nationalists saw the strike as a conspiracy on two distinct levels. 
As a party committed to a "win-the-war" policy the Nationalists regarded 
the strike as an attempt to thwart the war effort, thereby aiding the 
5. ibid. All these figures are from the same source 
6. W.M. Hughes in the "Argus", 13th November, 1917. Quoted in F.K. 
Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents, Vol. 1 (Melbourne 1973). 
7. S.M.H. 3rd August, 1917 
8. S.M.H. 8th August, 1917 
3. 
enemies of the Empire. The question of patriotism was used frequently 
during the course of the strike. Strikers were, in most cases,unjustly 
accused of being disloyal and unpatriotic, and'the recipients of German 
gold. This was significant since many people identified Australian 
nationalism with a sense of duty to the Empire, and looked unfavourably 
on any act which could be considered to be betraying this obligation or 
duty. The Nationalists also stressed that the strike was a challenge 
to representative Government in the State. Fuller, the Acting Premier 
of New South Wales, claimed that the strike was "in effect a rebellion 
against the orderly government of the community" and that the Government 
10 
would not be dictated to by unionists. On the 6th August, the Sydney 
Morning Herald carried an editorial titled "Who is to Rule?", which 
emphasised the need for the Government to govern, and as servants of 
the piiblic, to refuse to surrender to union demands. 
On the other hand, prominent figures in the labour movement were 
equally insistent that the strike had been deliberately engineered by 
the Nationalists and the employers, for the purpose of crushing the trade 
union movement. Together, they allegedly conspired to provoke the strike 
in the hope of eroding existing working conditions and forcing conscription 
on the workers. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine these "conspiracy" aspects 
of the strike. The term "conspiracy" is itself contentious, and with 
its sinister connotations, is highly emotive. It is important to note 
that apart from the instances when leading trade union officials were 
arrested an d charged with conspiracy, the word was not used in a formal 
or legal sense. Instead, it was used for propaganda purposes, and care 
9. V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs (Melbourne, 1964) p. 13 
10. S.M.H. 7th August, 1917. 
11. S.M.H. 6th August, 1917 
4. 
must be exercised in evaluating its use and implications. The whole 
concept of conspiracy in the case of the strike was an extension of 
bitterness over the Conscription campaign the previous year. Conscription 
had polarised Australian society and had split the Australian Labor Party, 
and these divisions would not be healed for the duration of the War. 
The defeat of Conscription was a shattering blow to the pro-Conscriptionists 
who felt that only with compulsory military service could Australia provide 
enough recruits to aid Britain in the War. People like Hughes and Holman, 
who were expelled from the Labor Party (since the Labor Party opposed 
Conscription) blamed the defeat of Conscription on the "I.W.W., Sinn Feiners 
and every disloyal section in Australia". 
Throughout the Conscription campaign, the pro-Conscriptionists had 
constantly attacked the I.W.W. and had made every effort to identify the 
I.W.W. as the centre of the "No" campaign and to identify laboiir anti-
12 
Conscriptionists with the I.W.W. The I.W.W. was not only opposed to 
the War. The organisation preached sabotage and "go-slowism" as methods 
13 
of fighting the capitalist system and naturally enough were despised 
by the establishment. At the height of the Conscription campaign, twelve 
leading fitures of the I.W.W. were arrested, tried and gaoled for crimes 
ranging from arson and forgery, but the ordinal charges, "levying war 
14 
agaxnst Hxs Majesty", that is, treason, were not proven. The attacks 
on the I.W.W. continued after the defeat of the Conscription Bill, and 
Hughes particularly tried to link the organisation with the labour move-
15 ment and to discredit it. 
12. I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics (Canberra 1965)p. 112 
13. I. Turner, Sydney's Burning, (Sydney, 1967) p. 20. 
14. P.J. Rushton, "The Trial of the Sydney Twelve: The Original Charge, 
Labour History, No. 25, November, 1973, p. 56 
15. ibid. p. 56 
5. 
The newly formed Nationalist Party (an alliance of former Liberals 
and expelled members of the Australian Labor Party) contested elections 
in New South Wales in March 1917 and federally in May of 1917, and was 
returned with a comfortable majority in each case. The respective leaders. 
Messrs. Holman and Hughes, both used "win-the-war" platforms during the 
elections and skillfully exploited the I.W.W. bogey while at the same 
time attacking former colleagues. For example, a Nationalist election 
poster tried to link A.W. Buckley, the Labor candidate for Surrey Hills, 
who was to play an important role in the strike, with the I.W.W.: 
"To show his belief in, and adherence to, the I.W.W. 
gospel of 'go slow', burning down buildings and other 
methods of destruction, Mr. Buckley moved at a meeting 
of the executive of the Railway and Tramway Employees' 
Association last year for a resolution to have I.W.W. 
speakers to attend general meetings and preach sabotage. 
This establishes conclusively that the Political Labour 
League and the I.W.W. are allied in this election contest. 
Unionists I Are you going to stand behind an organisation 
that burns down buildings and throws thousands of workers 
out of employment? 
Citizens! Are you going to vote for an agent of anarchy 
and incendiarism? 
Most of the I.W.W. members bear suspiciously foreign names. 
They have plenty of money. Where does it come 
from? Who pays these men to give their lives and liberty 
in burning down factories? Is it the Kaiser's American 
Agents?" 16 
The election victory for the Nationalists was later used as an explanation 
for the alleged conspiracy behind the strike. Hughes stressed that the 
real cause of the strike was political rather than industrial: 
16. Election Bill 1917 for the Nationalist Party. From the Mitchell 
Library, Sydney. 
6. 
"It is an attempt on the part of those responsible for the 
debacle of the 5th of May, when the great Labour Movement 
of Australia was split on the rocks, to get even with 
their opponents, to prevent those to whom the electors 
entrusted the reins of Government from carrying out their 
duty". 17 
In fact, throughout the strike, the Nationalists in the Federal Parliament 
and in New South Wales, constantly stressed that the strike was politically 
motivated, rather than industrially. Attempts to link the I.W.W. and the 
P.L.L. continued right up to the strike. Mr. Weaver, speaking in the 
Legislative Assembly on the 26th July, commented that there existed 
between the I.W.W. and the P.L.L. "an alliance of thought and an extra-
18 
ordinarily sjrmpathetic outlook". 
In this scenario of conflict that had been simmering since the 
Conscription campaign, the 1917 Strike erupted. The New South Wales 
Government's claims that the strike was a conspiracy masterminded by the 
I.W.W., that the strike was a threat to the war effort and that the 
strikers were disloyal was heard by S3rmpathetic ears. The Nationalists 
of New South Wales were very much a pro-Hughes party, supporting Conscription 
and his other war policies. It is probable that they were convinced that 
Hughes would assist in any strong action taken against the trade union 
movement at this time for the purpose of weeding out the I.W.W. saboteurs 
and shirkers. The term "shirkers", used by the Nationalists throughout 
the strike, is an interesting one. It was applied to those men who did 
not give full effort in their work, (that is, slow workers), but also 
referred to those who did not support their country at war (that is, who 
did not enlist). From the outset, the Nationalist Government of New 
South Wales demonstrated its determination to defeat the strike totally. 
17. W. M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXXXIII 
(second session) p. 1758 
18. N.S.W.P.P. (Second Series) Sessions 1917-18, Vol. LXVII pp. 224-225. 
7. 
There is little evidence to support the charge that the strike was 
a conspiracy on the part of the labour movement. With the passage of 
the Unlawful Associations Act, and later the Amendment, and the I.W.W. 
trials of 1916, most prominent I.W.W. men were in prison where they were 
certainly in no position to plan any such extensive action. Perhaps 
earlier I.W.W. agitation for general strikes and even the dream of 
amalgamating all unions into the One Big Union, gave a justification to 
the Government's claims. However, the evidence points to the strike 
being a spontaneous upheaval, supported by many workers discontented with 
existing economic and social conditions. E. J. Kavanagh, M.L.C. and 
spokesman for the Unions' Defence Committee, tried to keep the strike 
within the bounds of an industrial dispute while Mr. Hughes and Mr. Fuller 
decried it as being politically motivated. He stressed that it was 
19 
"purely an industrial matter, and had nothing to do with politics". 
He even chided members of the Labor Party for trying to make political 
capital from the strike. 
Allegations by members of the labour movement that the Nationalist 
Government of New South Wales, with the support of Hughes and the employers 
used the strike to attempt to crush trade unionism and to discredit the 
whole labour movement, also need examining. It was suggested that the 
Nationalists themselves had engaged in a conspiracy with the employers to 
achieve this. Evidence exists which seems to point to a conspiracy, 
but a number of weaknesses exist in this argument, and these will be 
discussed later. But certainly, the Government of New South Wales, by 
abetting the wholesale victimisation that took place after the strike, 
by flagrantly violating written agreements, seemed to be determined to 
destroy and discredit the labour movement. Hughes too showed his 
vindictiveness with his decisive role in the strike, and earned himself 
19. A.M.H. 8th August, 1917, 
20 
some chastisement from Justice Higgins. Motives for the actions of 
the Nationalists are discussed in a later chapter, but it is necessary 
to point out a basic feature of Nationalist Party thinking. The Party was 
created out of a common desire to win the war and consisted of many men 
who, because of their adherence to the view that Conscription was necessary, 
were forced to leave the Labor Party. Gollan makes the point that these 
Conscriptionists "were left licking their wounds, and (were) determined 
21 
not to permit another ma]or trade union victory". Thus, when the strike 
began, 
"The Government of New South Wales was spoiling for a 
fight which might avenge the Conscription defeat and 
restore the authority of the Government". 22 
With the determination to win the war still evident, and the memories 
of the lost Conscription campaign still present, the Nationalists approached 
the strike with a total victory in mind. 
20. H.B. Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (London, 1968) 
p. 55. Higgins suggested that Hughes in wanting to de-register 
the W.W.F. was merely seeking ven^ance and not justice. 
21. R. Gollan The Coal Miners of New South Wales (Melbourne, 1963) p. 148 
22. ibid. p. 148. 
9. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Genesis of the Card System and Its Effects 
The primary cause of the Strike was the introduction into the work-
shops of the New South Wales Railway and Tramways Department of the 
so-called "Card System". The refusal of the railway men to accept the 
Card System, and the insistence of the Commissioners in retaining it 
promoted the complaint that led to the Strike. The conflict surrounding 
the Card System assumed proportions that were excessive,for the issue 
was not, on the surface, contentious and the problems not insoluble. Yet 
both sides, the Unions and the Railway Commissioners and the Government, 
chose to magnify this dispute, to make a fighting stand, and this intran-
sigence sparked off the disastrous Strike. The problem is to establish 
why the Card System was introduced at this time, indeed, why at all, and 
then what effect it had on the ensuing events. 
The Card System was introduced ostensibly as a costing system, that 
is, for determining the cost of running the service as compared with the 
return. The Commissioners felt that some costing system was needed in 
view of the fact that the Department's pre-war profits to the value of 
£211,047 had by 1917 fallen to a deficit of some £412,253 with the Rail-
ways Division suffering the greatest losses. There were a number of 
reasons for this. In his 1915 Report, the Chief Commissioner pointed out 
that earnings had fallen due to the outbreak of war, a bad drought in 
late 1914 which reduced the need for transportation of wheat and cattle, 
2 
and a general decrease in business activity. Mounting costs and interest 
1. New South Wales Government Railways and Tramways - Reports of the 
Chief Commissioner, N.S.W. P.P. 1914-1917. See Appendix A for 
additional figures. 
2. Reports of Chief Commission for 1915, N.S.W.P.P. 4th Session, Vol. 6, 
1915-1916, p.5 
10. 
rates, free transport of war materials and troops and work in the manufacture 
of munitions at the Eveleigh and Randwick workshops also greatly added to 
3 
the costs. The Commissioner, it seems, felt that the problem lay with 
increases in wages which, he felt, the Department could not absorb, and 
consequently made an application to the Court of Industrial Arbitration 
for the suspension of such clauses of the awards of Wages Boards that 
provided for periodical pay rises to salaried officers and wages staff. 
Although the application was dismissed, it showed that the Commissioners 
5 were concerned with mounting costs, and that they were prepared to 
limit these where possible. 
It was in 1915 that I.W.W. posters and slogans first began appearing 
in the Department workshops, and caused much apprehension to the 
Commissioners. The I.W.W. called for "slow work" since this would mean 
employment for fellow workers. A number of connections were established 
between individuals in the Railway workshops and the I.W.W. Buckley, as 
previously shown, was involved; William Teen, one of the I.W.W. twelve, 
7 
was on the council of A.R.T.S.A. but was dismxssed. The Commxssloners, 
3. Reports of Chief Commissioner 1914-1917. See particularly N.S.W. P.P. 
5th Session, Vol. 4, p. 529. 
4. Report of Chief Commissioner 1915, N.S.W.P.P., 4th Session, Vol. 5. p.6 
5. In all reports during the war years, wage rises were cited as primary 
causes of increased expenditure. 
6. Mr. Cargill (solicitor for the Department), Minutes of Evidence, Royal 
Commission of Inquiry in the Job and Time Cards System in the Railway 
and Tramway Workshops, H.R. Curlewis presiding. N.S.W.P.P. Vol. 6, 
1918, p.2. 
7. Minutes A.R.T.S.A. April/May 1916. According to Tom Barker, another 
of the I.W.W. Twelve, Tom Glynn had worked on the trams in Sydney, but 
this appears to have been at an earlier time. See E.C. Fry Tom Barker 
and the I.W.W. (Canberra, 1965) p. 16. 
11. 
fearing that the I.W.W. propaganda and principles would take firm root 
in the workshops, dismissed or suspended any workers thought to be holding 
I.W.W. ideas. Later, upon signing declarations disclaiming any S5niipathy 
with the I.W.W. or their ideas, they were reinstated. There is no 
doubt that I.W.W. propaganda was influential to a degree, but the extent 
was often exaggerated by the opponents of the I.W.W. Sympathy with the 
I.W.W. appeared to be more in line with working class solidarity, than 
with the ideology of the I.W.W. For example, the council of A.R.T.S.A. 
in December 1915 after the I.W.W. trials, passed a resolution stating 
that. 
"Whilst in total disagreement with the tactics and methods 
of the I.W.W. this council records an emphatic protest 
against the cruel and relentless persecution to which its 
members are subjected".9 
Yet Mr. Eraser, who became Chief Commissioner in 1917, was still concerned 
that I.W.W. ideas had taken root in the workshops. He complained that 
he had himself seen men who were going through the motions of working but 
, . 10 
producxng nothxng. In January 1917, while discussing slow work in the 
workshops, Fraser noted that 
"There has been evidence of late that there is in every industry 
a section of the workers who favour, for their own ends, 
industrial ferment and disorder, and whose every effort is 
constantly bent to produce these conditions ... 'Work slowly', 
'stop work', 'do what damage you can' are mottoes they endeavour 
to instill". 11 
Commenting, Tom Barker replied: 
"At the present rate ... the boss will be in dungarees about 
1955 ... Slowing down is a more effective way of dealing with 
the working class nightmare of unemployment than soup 
kitchens and unemployment parades". 12 
8. Direct Action 6th January, 1917 
9. Minutes, the Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Services Association, 
12th December, 1916. 
10. Fraser, in Curlewis Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence, p.9 
11. New South Wales Railway and Tramway Budget (Official organ of the 
New South Wales Government Railways and Tramways Institute) March 1 
1917, p.231 (See Appendix B for Eraser's figures) 
12. Direct Action, 22nd January, 1917 
12. 
The connection between the I.W.W. and the Railway workshops is of 
fundamental importance in understanding subsequent events. The Commiss-
ioners were obviously concerned at I.W.W. influence in their workshops 
and associated the losses sustained in the service with this influence. 
The introduction of the Card System was partly the result of this 
concern, for the Commissioners were determined to weed out unproductive 
workers, and a costing system such as the one proposed in 1917 would 
serve this purpose. 
Systems of costing and time-keeping were not uncommon in private 
industries throughout the country and existed in some Government enter-
prises, the Railways and Tramways Department being one. Up until the 
outbreak of the war, and some months later, the workmen in the Railways 
service had made their own record of the time occupied and other details 
of the job they were engaged in. The details were set out in sheets 
and then passed on to time clerks who recorded the information on record 
13 
sheets. The system proved to be unsatisfactory, since the men gave 
only grudging support and costing could not be accurately determined. As 
a consequence, in June 1916, a system of Cards was introduced which did 
not differ greatly from the system that had previously existed. Again 
it was opposed by the workmen because each man had the duty of entering 
on his own card the time occupied in doing each job given to him by the 
14 
foreman, and the men generally opposed the clerical work involved. 
After a good deal of protest from the Labor Minister for Railways, the 
13. Mr. Cargill, Minutes of Evidence, Curlewis Commission, p.2. 
14. The New South Wales Strike Crisis, 1917. Report prepared by the 
Industrial Commissioner, J.B. Holme. Supplement to New South Wales 
Industrial Gazette, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1918, p.5a. 
13. 
15 
the system was withdrawn. The Chief Commissioner, however, stressed that 
the system was being withdrawn only temporarily until a better system was 
developed. In addition, an agreement was reached between the men and the 
Commissioners that there would be no changes made to working conditions 
during the course of the war, the men in return promising to avoid 
16 
industrial action. 
On July 20th, 1917, a new Card System was introduced into the work-
shops. It differed only slightly from the one introduced a year earlier. 
Instead of the workmen recording their own times, sub-foremen would be 
engaged whose duties included checking the work and recording the time 
taken by men over each particular job. The system was introduced without 
notice and immediately aroused a great deal of opposition. The timing 
of this move by the Commissioners was significant. The Cards were intro-
duced shortly after a State election had swept the Nationalist Party to 
power, the Commissioners no doubt anticipating less interference over 
this matter from a more conservative ministry. Nevertheless, in the light 
of past opposition from the men regarding the introduction of any card 
system, the Commissioners must have expected trouble, and trouble they 
got. 
The Card System introduced in July 1917 was essentially an inform-
ation system. The time taken by each workman over a particular job would 
be recorded on cards and this information would enable the Commissioners 
to determine costs, output, and to work out where improvements could be 
carried out. It would also, of course, isolate slow workers, and Fraser, 
15. Minutes, A.R.T.S.A. 21st June, 1916. 
16. Mr. Fuller later denied that this agreement was reached, stating 
that "no such undertaking was ever given, but there was an implied 
Understanding that wages, hours of employment, overtime rates, and 
privileges should not be interfered with during the war..." (Daily 
Telegraph, 27th August, 1917). Mr. Fraser too denied that any such 
^ ^ e n reached, but without qualification, SMH 3rd August,1917 .J. L. 
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conscious of I.W.W. sympathies in the workshops, no doubt intended to 
use this information to rid the service of any surviving I.W.W. elements. 
It is difficult to establish positively whether or not the introduction 
of the Card System was a deliberately provocative action on the part of 
the Commissioners. Senator O'Keefe doubted that it was even necessary 
17 
to introduce the Card System at all. Certainly, the workmen in the 
service took it as such, as subsequent actions confirm. 
On the 27th July, a deputation consisting of Mr. Padgen, the 
president of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, and Mr. Dengate, an 
organiser with that union, met with the Railway Commissioners to air the 
grievances of the men regarding the Card System. They told the Commiss-
ioners that the men feared the Card System was a "speeding up" system. 
similar to the Taylor System being used in the Ford workshop in America. 
The Taylor System relied on sub-foremen taking charge of a group of workmen 
and timing them during the performance of a job. The time would be judged 
against the fastest workmen and this would be more or less taken as the 
mean. It was generally,throughout the world, a most unpopular system 
19 
amongst workers. The men feared they would be forced to speed-up too. 
The appointment of forty-five new sub-foremen at Randwick, and eighty at 
Eveleigh seemed to confirm in the men's eyes that it was the Taylor System 
20 
that the Commissioners were in fact introducing. The Chief Commissioner's 
reply was that it was not a system of "speeding-up" and that it would not 
21 
affect the average worker only the wilfully slow one. This poxnt was 
17. This was as a response to claims made by Mr. Lucy, the Chief Mechanical 
Engineer at the Eveleigh Workshops before the Card System was introduced, 
that he was satisfied that he was getting an efficient return for the 
expenditure outlaid. See Appendix C for details. 
18. Minutes of the Meeting with the Deputation, Curlewis Commission, p.75. 
19. From a manifesto of Unions' Defence Committee, in Daily Telegraph 
13th August, 1917. 
20. From Deputation, Curlewis Commission, p. 75 
21. ibid. p.78 
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an important one in both the Government's and Commissioner's justification 
of the Card System. They both continually stressed that the "honest work-
men", or the workman who did a fair day's work, should have nothing to fear 
from the Card System. The slow worker would be found out and dismissed. 
The Chief Commissioner informed the second deputation: 
"There are workers still in the Department who should be, 
in the public interest, eliminated from State employment, 
and those shirkers will be eliminated if the present ad-
ministration remains as the Railway Administration of the 
State". 22 
The matter of so-called "speeding up" raised a number of issues. If, 
for example, a workman did work faster, to what degree would safety be 
considered? Or, how well could he perform his task? The men felt that 
fast work would mean greater danger to themselves and unsatisfactory 
completion of jobs. In both cases, they could find themselves out of 
work. Or else, a worker could be cited for slow work when it was not his 
fault. For example, in all the workshops, there was, according to the 
men, a severe shortage of tools and equipment which was responsible for 
23 
an enormous loss of time. Men had to wait for tools or materials and 
sometimes even their jobs, and an unsympathetic foreman would regard this 
as idleness. In an orderly workshop, such waste would not occur and there 
would be no need for a Card System. The men had as many complaints 
regarding efficiency in the service as did the Commissioners. The Manifesto 
of 11th August noted: 
"There has always been a dearth of small hand tools, yet 
there are machines at Eveleigh which cost hundreds of 
pounds that have never earned as many pence. New machines 
have never done a day's work - scrap. Who ordered these 
machines, and who paid for them?" 24 
22. J. Fraser during the Second Deputation headed by E. J. Kavanagh, 
Curlewis Commission, p.81. 
23. Manifesto of Unions' Defence Committee, 11th August, 1917. Quoted in 
J.B. Holme, The NS.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p.95a 
24. ibid. p.95a 
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Contradicting the Chief Commissioner's statements about the quantity of 
work being performed by the men, the Manifesto continued: 
"Much is heard about slow work, but does the public know 
that it takes a fortnight under favourable circumstances 
for a paper from an employee to reach the Chief Mechanical 
Engineer - a distance of about three hundred yards? It 
often takes a fortnight for some clerk to put a pencil 
mark on it without ever reaching its destination." 25 
This seems to indicate that there was genuine dissatisfaction amongst the 
men with the way the service was being run. It was not simply a case of 
the men being unproductive. 
Mr. Padgen, at the Deputation, claimed that men could be accused 
under the Card System of slow work at times when it was not their fault, 
26 for example, when waiting for tools, materials, and so on. This could 
particularly be the case if the sub-foreman recording the times was 
unsympathetic or unscrupulous. Since the cards were to be secret, the 
men would not know exactly how they were being treated. 
On the 31st, a second deputation met with the Railway Commissioners 
and was headed this time by Mr. E. J. Kavanagh, Secretary of the New South 
Wales Labour Council. A meeting the night before of fourteen unions 
involved had endorsed the Deputation, in the hope that its members could 
27 xnduce the Commissioners to withdraw the Card System. The Railway 
Commissions re-affirmed their commitment, claiming that it was not a system 
of "speeding up", but simply an improvement on earlier costing systems, 
and that the honest worker would have nothing to fear. They made a concession 
in agreeing to allow the men to inspect and initial their own cards. They 
emphasised that the system would not be withdrawn under any circumstances. 
25. ibid. p. 95a 
26. Padgen, Curlewis Commission, p. 75 
27. These are the unions that were immediately affected by the introduction 
of the Card System. See Appendix D. 
17. 
E. J. Kavanagh summed up the feelings of the men at the time of the Curlewis 
Commission. He said the men regarded the Card System as the "thin edge 
of the wedge - the first installment of the Taylor Card System in 
28 
America". He complained thafthe Commissioners were attempting to 
introduce the most up-to-date costing system in the world to the most 
29 
out-of-date workshops in the world". Generally, he reported that it 
was not so much the Card System itself but how it could be used. Mr. Justice 
Curlewis in his Royal Commission on the Cards in 1918 did not agree that 
time cards necessarily were evil but he did say that "there can be no 
doubt that the system is one which in the hands of an unscrupulous employer, 
30 
is capable of afflicting grave hardships". He stressed that abuses 
could take place and great vigilance was needed to see that these abuses 
did not take place. Nevertheless, at the time of the Deputation, the 
Commissioners argued that the men had presented no case as to why the Cards 
should be withdrawn, that their suspicions were without basis, and the 
Cards would not be withdrawn. 
A meeting of the fourteen unions involved in the dispute was held 
on the night of the 31st and it re-affirmed a resolution that had been made 
the night before that "... an ultimatum be issued to the Government that 
unless the Card System is withdrawn by next Thursday, the whole of the 
31 
unions concerned will stop work". This ultimatum was delivered to both 
28. Curlewis Commission, p. 23. This, the men alleged, was also the 
beginning of "piece work". Fraser initially denied this but at the 
Curlewis Commission he conceded that "the bonus system is undoubtedly 
the proper system to introduce in any workshop", ibid. p.81-82. 
29. ibid. p.23 
30. ibid. p. 156 
31. S.M.H. 1st August, 1917. 
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the Railway Commissioners and the Government on the following day. 
Predictably, neither the Commissioners nor the Government would bow to 
the ultimatum. Late attempts were made, particularly by the leader of 
the Opposition, Mr. John Storey, to bring about a settlement, but a late 
32 
night conference between the disputing parties failed to resolve the issue. 
Mr. Fuller appealed to the unionists to avoid a strike and stated 
"If the precipitate action of the unionists concerned 
results in a strike, I can only say in conclusion, 
that the Government will stand by every loyal workman. 
The matter is not a legitimate subject for industrial 
dispute, and the workmen who respond to call to national 
service will receive ample protection and reward for 
their action, whatever the consequences may be". 33 
This prophetic pronouncement suggests that the Government had already 
decided before the Strike that they were going to fight the unions to 
the finish, and how it was going to be done. Only the final action was 
now needed. 
On the following morning, the 2nd August, members of the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers, upon finding that the Cards had not been withdrawn, 
stopped work at the Randwick and Eveleigh workshops. Their example was 
34 
followed by fellow members in other workshops in Sydney and the State. 
Some five thousand members stopped that day, starting a long and bitter 
struggle between the Unions and the Nationalist Government of New South 
Wales. The Card System was the catalyst. The intransigence of both 
sides made some sort of industrial collision likely. Moderation was really 
lacking at a time when it was most needed and this meant that any attempt 
to remedy the situation was doomed to fail. 
32. S.M.H. 2nd August, 1917 
33. S.M.H. 2nd August, 1917 
34. J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, pp.7a, 8a. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Conspiracy and the Causes of the Strike 
After the strike broke out, the Government made it very clear what 
their attitude was regarding its causes. On Friday, 3rd August, the 
Acting Premier, Mr. Fuller, issued a statement which alleged that the 
Government suspected some type of political conspiracy led by undesirable 
elements in the labour movement, and which also indicated that the Govern-
ment was prepared to make its stand on this issue of the Card System. 
Fuller claimed that 
"We are not dealing with a revolt of workmen against 
oppressive conditions. We are dealing with Trades 
Unionism for the time being under the control of 
irresponsible and dangerous men who, for politbal 
reasons, have determined to plunge and keep the comm-
unity in a state of industrial ferment ... There can 
be no compromise on the part of the Government, when 
an issue of this kind is raised. The time has come 
for the people of this State to take their stand 
against those extremists who have for a long time been 
conspiring against the public interest and who have 
been responsible for the industrial ferment which has 
disgraced this State since the beginning of the war ., nl 
Later, in a proclamation to the people of New South Wales, Fuller reiterated 
the identity of those whom his Government suspected were behind the strike. 
"The enemies of Britain and her Allies have succeeded in 
plunging Australia into a General Strike. For the time 
being, they have crippled our country's efforts to assist 
in the Great War. 
At the back of this strike lurk the I.W.W and the expon-
ents of Direct Action. 
Without realising it, many Trades Unions have become the 
tools of Disloyalists and Revolutionaries. 
A great conspiracy has been fermenting for the past two 
years to prevent Australia rendering further assistance 
to Britain and her Allies. 
Every striker is playing a game for Disloyalists. 
Every striker is singing from day to day the hymns of 
the I.W.W. and marching to their music". 2 
1. S.M.H. Friday, August 3rd, 1917. 
2. This statement appeared as an advertisement in the Sunday Sun and the 
Sunday Times on the 12th August, 1917. Here, it is taken from J.B. 
Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917. 
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Finally, during a meeting with a deputation from the wives of the 
strikers on the 9th August, Mr. Fuller again stressed his position and 
that of his Government: 
"This is not a revolt against the Card System, but 
against the Nationalist Government ... I say plainly 
that they are being led by men who are not only 
enemies of this Government, but who are friends of 
the enemies of the Empire who would take away all 
your privileges, devastate your homes, and make you 
the servile slaves of the Kaiser, instead of keeping 
you a free people under the flag of Old England", 3 
It was probably predictable that the Nationalist Government of New 
South Wales would react to the strike in these terms. The I.W.W. had become 
a bogey even before the Nationalist Party had been formed, and had later 
been employed skillfully and successfully by that Party in the 1917 State 
and Federal elections. The tactic of branding the strikers as "disloyalists", 
agents of the Kaiser, traitors, and generally assisting the German war 
effort, also was not novel, and was certainly consistent with the char-
acter of the Nationalist Party. Since the difficult days of the Conscription 
debates and referendum a year earlier, members of that Party had been 
obsessed with the apparent presence of enemy agents on Australian soil. 
Essentially a "win-the-war" Party, the Nationalists were ready to vent 
their outrage on anything or anyone that stood in the way of the war 
effort. They believed that the strike, by holding up transport and the 
manufacture of materials necessary for war, did hold back the war effort. 
This is largely why the Nationalists were by no means confined to the 
State Party. Hughes echoes these sentiments when he said, in retrospect, 
after the event; 
3, S.M.H. 11th August, 1917. 
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"The recent strike, the most serious in the history of 
Australia, was the fruits of a deliberate conspiracy 
for this purpose. It was engineered by the same men who 
had driven out of the Labour movement every man who 
dared to put his country, in the hour of its greatest 
peril, before his Party, and its mean and petty interests. 
It was supported by the I.W.W., by Sinn Fein, by every 
disloyal section in Australia". 4 
This belief is what caused Hughes to side with the Nationalists in New 
South Wales so decisively in the strike. 
It was an easy step for the Nationalists to combine the threat of the 
I.W.W. and the threat that the strike offered to the war effort and allege 
a conspiracy. But was it valid? The evidence suggests that it was not. 
By August, 1917, the I.W.W. barely existed. The Unlawful Associations 
5 
Act of 1916 had broken the back of the organisation, and the amendments 
to the Act in July of 1917 enabled the police to mop up remaining elements. 
The Government overestimated the direct influence that the I.W.W. had on 
the trade unions which clearly, at this time, could only have been limited. 
They also overestimated the influence of the officers of the various 
unions over their members and the cohesion of the trade union movement 
generally. Fuller repeatedly insisted that the men were influenced by 
their leaders, and challenged the unions to hold ballots to determine if 
they should stay out on strike or not. 
4. From the "Argus", Melbourne, 13th November, 1917. Quoted in F.K. Crowley, 
Modern Australia in Documents, Vol. 1 (Melbourne, 1973) p. 289. 
5. This Act had been passed because Hughes was not satisfied that the 
existing legislation, the War Precautions Act, could effectively deal 
with the I.W.W. The new Act gave him much wider powers. See G. Saŵ êr 
Australian Politics and Law 1901-1929 (Melbourne, 1972) p.135. It is 
significant that although Hughes tried to link the I.W.W. with the 
labour movement, the new Act was not opposed by Labor members in the 
House, Tudor declared that he was opposed to "go-slow, sabotage, murder, 
arson, which seemed to be the policies of the I.W.W." See Childe, 
op. cit. p.149 
6. Daily Telegraph, 14th August, 1917. 
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In fact, union leaders had less control over the strikers than the 
Government thought. The initial opposition to the Card System, for example, 
came from the men rather than their leaders. At the second deputation 
to the Railway Commissioners on the 31st July, E.J. Kavanagh suggested that 
the Commissioners' terms be put to the men with a view to accepting them, 
but others, notably Padgen and Dengate, claimed that, in the light of their 
7 
xnstructions, they knew the terms would not be accepted. During the early 
part of the strike, the Defence Committee, acting on behalf of the 
strikers, found themselves swamped with representatives of the various 
unions and found it difficult to determine a uniform policy on which to 
g 
fight the strike. Kavanagh demonstrated the problem faced by the 
Defence Committee and the determination of the rank-and-file unionists 
when he reported that the difficulty was not in getting them to come out, 
9 
but xn keeping them in. The conservative daily paper, the Sydney Morning 
Herald was concerned that 
"... the men have acted in opposition to the advice of 
their representatives. The union leadership have been 
dragged along instead of keeping their place in the van, 
and in this latest development of mischief, it looks as 
though the restraining influence of men feeling the 
responsibility of power and loath to hurry their unions 
into collision with the Government was of little value 
at the last moment". 10 
H.E. Boote, editor of the Worker, who stressed the role of the rank-and-file 
unionists in the strike, wrote: 
7. Curlewis Commission, Appendix J.l "Minutes of Evidence 
8. K.D. Buckley The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia 1852-1920 
(Canberra 1970) p. 264. 
9. Labour Council of New South Wales Report, The Railway Strike 1917, p.l, 
10. S.M.H. 10th August, 1917. 
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"I never hoped to see the workers so united. This revolt 
against Government ̂ yranny is a spontaneous manifestation 
of feeling. The men took matters into their own hands. 
The officers had nothing to do but voice the demands of the 
rank-and-file".11 
When these statements are considered with reference to the coixrse of 
events during the strike, it is plain that any notion of union leadership 
dominating the course of events and fomenting some kind of "conspiracy" 
was at best, an exaggeration; at worst, it was false. 
While it is necessary to examine the Government's contention that the 
strike was a result of a conspiracy of extremists, it would be erroneous 
to accept the position that the introduction of the Card System was the 
sole cause of the strike. It is true that it was the Card System that 
sparked off the strike, but there were other significant underlying 
currents of discontent throughout the country's workforce. This is a 
particularly important point, since neither side in the strike accepted 
that the Card System was the real cause of the strike. Mr. Dengate, 
during the deputation to the Railway Commissioners, claimed that if the 
Commissioners had introduced the Card System quietly there would have 
12 been no trouble at all. Mr. Claude Thompson, secretary of A.R.T.S.A., 
insisted that 
"had the dispute been confined to the time card system, 
there would have been no general cessation of work on 
the part of the Amalgamated members, except such as 
are employed in Railway and Tramway workshops". 13 
The Striker carried an article which said: 
11. The Worker 16th August, 1917 
12. Dengate, Curlewis Commission, Appendix J, Minutes of Evidence. 
13. Statement by Claude Thompson, authorised by the Unions' Defence 
Committee, Sydney, 13th August, 1917. 
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"No sane man believes that it is the Card System they 
are troubling about; that is only the thin end of the 
wedge intended to split unionism, and bring about a 
general reduction in wages, longer hours, and more 
degrading conditions of labour". 14 
It has already been demonstrated that the Government believed that a 
conspiracy was behind the strike, and not really the Card System. 
Certainly, there was discontent in the workforce which no doubt contri-
buted to the men's willingness to strike and this discontent needs to be 
examined. 
From the outset of the war, it was obvious that many workers would 
have to face greater hardships than they had before. War and drought 
immediately brought about an increase in the price of meat and flour. For 
example, between July 1914 and May 1915 in Melbourne, the price of food and 
groceries in the Commonwealth rose from 22/lld. to 25/5d. (based on a 
weighted average in shillings and pence) and in Sydney from 23/ld. to 
15 
30/lOd. Rents rose as well in this period. Overall, the cost of 
living rose dramatically, particularly in Sydney; and during the whole 
period of the war. New South Wales was by the most expensive State to 
1 fi 
live in. Wages rose too, but hardly in proportion to the rise in 
prices. The average weekly wage rose from 55/3d. in June 1914, to 74/lld. 
in December 1919 for male workers; and from 27/2d. to 37/ld. for female 
1 n 1 g 
workers. In real terms, however, wages actually decreased. In the 
early years of the war, unemployment figures showed tha.t 6.5% of workers 
14. The Striker, issued by the authority of the Unions' Defence Committee 
Sydney, 13th August, 1917. 
15. From N.S.W. Industrial Gazette Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1918. See Appendix E 
for figures 
16. Scott, op. cit. p. 634 
17. ibid. p. 634 
18. See Table, Appendix F. 
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who were union members were unemployed. This rose to 8.3% in 1914, and 
19 
9.3% in 1915. Figures remained relatively high for the remainder of 
the war period. 
These figures can be attributed partially to a general fluctuation 
caused by the outbreak of the war, which affected trade, finance available 
for public expenditure, the cost of the war effort, and so on. Workers, 
however, attributed this to war-time profiteering by the capitalists. 
Probably, all these factors contributed to the worsening economic situation. 
but certainly it was the workers who suffered most. They continued to be 
denied by wage freezes, while prices remained high. Mr. Justice Powers 
in the judgement of the New South Wales Court of Industrial Arbitration 
in its inquiries into the cost of living and the minimum wage, told the 
workers what was expected of them: 
"I realise that people cannot live in these days in 
reasonable comfort on the living wage prescribed if they 
attempt to maintain the same regimen as in the days before 
the war and drought. If clothing goes up in price, 
ordinary people are most careful of what they possess 
and of new purchases. If butter goes up to a high price, 
other things are used in its place. If meat goes up in 
price, less is used". 20 
He went on to reflect what was the accepted view of governments and 
employers that "important reasons for the rising costs of prices were 
the high incidence of strikes, industrial sabotage and go-slow, and for 
21 
these, workers were themselves responsible. Workers could have had 
little joy from words like these. 
19. Commonwealth Labour Reports. Quoted from I. Turner, Industrial Labour 
and Politics, (Canberra 1965) p. 253. See Appendix G for additional 
figures. 
20. Mr. Justice Powers, New South Wales Industrial Gazette, Vol. 10, No. 5 
1915. p.920. 
21. ibid. pp.922-924 
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The severe economic position and unemplojmient and retrenchment in the 
early years of the war gave workers little opportunity to improve their 
conditions - legal restrictions prevented improvements through Wages Boards, 
and a pool of unemployment meant any direct action would be unlikely to 
succeed. Not until the successful Coalminers' Strike in 1916 did the 
position change, and by then unionists everywhere were ready to take 
action to alleviate their frustrations. Such was the position in 1917. 
These generally poor conditions affected unionists as a whole but 
on the eve of the strike, many unions had specific grievances of their 
own, none more so than the various railway unions. On the 8th August, 
Mr. Ainsworth, secretary of the Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and 
Cleaners' Association stated a number of grievances his Union had: 
"Do you know - do the public know - that the eight-hour 
principle as applied to us is a misnomer?... A man may 
be called to sign on at 2 a.m. and when he arrives with 
his food supply, he is told that he is not wanted, but 
to come again at 4 a.m. ... For this time, he is not 
paid. He was been walking and waiting all through the 
night and then, when the official deigns to sign him on, 
he is worked for anything up to twelve, and sometimes 
thirteen, hours". 22 
Ainsworth also mentioned other grievances, such as broken shifts, short 
time, the difficulty of putting cases to the Appeals Board and the way the 
Commissioners could dismiss employees without advancing reasons. These were 
all major causes for dissatisfaction and the Card System was merely "a spark 
23 
that fell in a cauldron of seething discontent and industrial impatience." 
22. The Case of the Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners' 
Association published with the concurrence of the Unions' Defence 
Committee. Daily Telegraph 9th August, 1917. 
23. ibid. 
27. 
Representatives of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, as was 
stated in the previous chapter, complained that slackness and waste in 
the workshops, for which the workers were being held responsible, was 
mainly the result of managerial incompetence, and lack of tools, equipment 
24 
and materials. Mr. Claude Thompson, secretary of A.R.T.S.A. outlined 
similar complaints, but added others: 
"For upwards of thirty years men have been groaning 
under an oppressive system, unbearable conditions, 
and a miserable pittance of wages. After long years 
of waiting they received an award which was not 
satisfactory." 25 
He claimed that the service was "seething with discontent" that was the 
result of a "long policy of pinpricks and goadings on the part of the 
Railway Commissioners". He claimed too that the Card System only 
sparked off trouble that had already been brewing. Members of the New 
South Wales Amalgamated Sheet Metal Worker Society complained that engineers 
27 
at the Randwxck workshops were doing their work, such as soldering. 
This appears to be of little importance but, in fact, to the union members, 
it was quite significant. 
Although the Card System initially was confined to a relatively small 
number of engineers working at Randwick, it was widely believed by the 
workers in the Service, that the system would spread to other branches and 
to other workshops. Other unionists were ready to support the engineers 
in their fight against the Card System but also wanted to air their own 
grievances. This made the task difficult for the Defence Committee 
24. Manifesto of Unions' Defence Committee, 11th August 1917. Quoted from 
J.B. Holme, N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, Appendix 20, pp. 94a-95a. 




because other issues clouded the central dispute over the Card System. 
E.J. Kavanagh pointed out the problems: 
"It was originally intended to confine the strike to 
those directly affected by the Card System, but this 
was impossible owing to the general dissatisfaction 
which existed throughout the Railway Service, due to 
the failure to remedy long-standing grievances and to 
the limited scope of the Arbitration Act, which pre-
cluded the Court or Boards from dealing with matters 
of vital importance to the employees." 28 
After the strike broke out in the Railway workshops, it soon spread 
to all industries, embracing unions that had no immediate connection at 
all with the Card System. Miners, builders, catering unions, wharf labourers 
seamen, all came out in support of the railway men. Boote described this 
in the Worker: 
"One after another the unions rushed to the assistance 
of their mates who were attacked. They needed no 
prompting. They did not wait to be appealed to. 
With a passion for class loyalty as grand as unparalleled, 
they took the field and swept to battle."29 
The degree of support amongst the "sympathy" strikers is significant. 
Many unions involved had little or nothing to gain from striking; some 
had a lot to lose. For example, the coalminers had won a good award in 
1916, with the provision that they would take no part in strikes for a 
period of three years. They had a good deal to lose. So did the wharf 
labourers, who were working under a favourable Federal award. That they 
all felt the need to express their dissatisfaction in this way is a 
reflection of the discontent that existed in the unions. It was not 
conspiracy that brought them out. It was, as Boote described, "a spontan-
. „ 30 
ecus manifestation of feelxng". 
28. Labour Council of New South Wales. Report, 1917, p.3. 




The Extent of the Strike and Its Defeat 
After the Engineers stopped work on the morning of 2nd August, there 
was still time to negotiate a settlement, and avoid a general strike. 
Since the Card System only affected a relatively small number of men, an 
early settlement would have been desirable, and possibly easier to achieve. 
Yet both sides made only tentative gestures, and already their intran-
sigence was evident. It was still possible at this time for a settlement 
to be reached without either side losing face, and subsequent events showed 
that tactical blunders by both sides contributed to the fateful strike. 
Negotiations for a settlement did take place between the Government 
and the Defence Committee for the Unions. The point on which the negot-
iations broke downwas the timing of an inquiry on the Card System. The 
government, with the concurrence of the Commissioners, made the following 
offers to the unions: 
1. That if in three months it could, before a public inquiry, 
be shown that the system was unjust, it would be revised. 
2. That every man should, each day if so desired, inspect and 
initial his card relating to the previous day's work. 
The latter proposal would theoretically allay any fears the workmen may 
have had regarding abuses in implementing the Card System. The men had 
been concerned that the cards would be kept secret and they would not know 
how accurate entries by the sub-foremen would be. The first proposal 
suggested that the Card System be given a trial, and if found to be 
unsatisfactory, it would be replaced, but such was the lack of faith 
1. Government ultimatum, S.M.H. 7th August, 1917. 
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amongst the men towards the Government and the Commissioners, that Mr. 
Dengate had to point out that "it was no use giving this a trial for 
some months or years and then find we cannot get rid of it".^ It is 
significant that the Government's proposal offered only a revision of 
the system if it was found unsatisfactory, and not a withdrawal, which 
was what the men wanted. 
E. J. Kavanagh made a set of counter-proposals to the Government. 
These were that: 
1. The Railway Commissioners revert to the position as it 
existed on the 1st June last 
2. The Government appoint a Royal Commission consisting of 
representatives of the Railway Commissioner and the 
Unions concerned 
3 
3. Upon this being granted, the men will return to work. 
These proposals could have been accepted. The Government could still 
have saved face, and would have appeared reasonable, with the best 
interests of the men at heart. Furthermore, it was likely that any inquiry 
would have accepted the Card System in principle. Thus, not only could 
the Card System have been introduced but a strike could also have been 
avoided. Further proposals were submitted to the Government from a 
deputation on the 8th August. These were a little more specific and 
suggested that; 
2, Dengate, Second Deputation to the Commissioners, Appendix J, 
Curlewis Commission p.83. 
3. From a letter to E.J. Kavanagh to G. Fuller, 4th August, 1917 Quoted 
from J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p. B8a. 
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1. The State Government request Mr. Justice Edmunds to act 
as arbitrator and to inquire into the whole grievance 
2. In the meantime, the Card System was suspended 
3. On Mr. Justice Edmunds being appointed, all the employees 
return to work, or alternatively, 
4. The inquiry be held while the men are out, the strike in 
the meantime to be no further extended. 
It would be wrong to assume that the Government had a responsibility to 
accept the men*s demands as such. But to have taken a position that 
ensured that a major and catastrophic strike would take place surely 
showed a lack of responsibility. This is particularly the case when it 
is considered that the Nationalists had been elected on a platform 
which stressed the importance of winning the war. This apparent contra-
diction prompted one Labor M.L.A. to ask 
"... is it a fact that the Nationalist Party was elected, 
or obtained the confidence of the people, on account of 
its policy to assist in winning the war? If so, does he 
(Fuller) not think that the methods now being adopted by 
the Railway Commissioners, supported by the Cabinet, are 
one means of arresting the enemy rather than of assisting 
to win the war?"5 
When the Engineers cameout on 2nd August, they were soon followed 
by fuelmen at Eveleigh on the 3rd and the Locomotive Engine Drivers, 
Firemen and Cleaners' Association and A.R.T.S.A. on the 5th August. These 
unions joined in sympathy with the Engineers, but also to redress some of 
their own grievances. In fact, the L.E.D.F.C.A. appointed a grievance 
4. S.M.H. 9th August 1917. This deputation was headed by A.C. Willis, 
of the A.C.S.E.F. 
5. Mr. Keegan N.S.W.P.P. (Second Series) Vol. LXVII pp. 441-442. 
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committee to prepare a case that could be presented to the Commissioner 
in the event of a settlement. At any rate, by the end of the first week 
of the strike, employees from most sections of the Railway and Tramway 
Service were on strike. Yet already, a basic weakness in the unions' 
position was evident. Not all employees in the service did stop work. 
A sufficient number stayed at work, and with the assistance of staff 
members, the Railway Commissioners were able to keep at least a skeleton 
service operating. This greatly weakened the position of the strikers. 
Such was the discontent among the workers in New South Wales that 
when the strike broke out in the railway workshops, the possibility of a 
general strike soon loomed as a reality. As previously stated, rank-and-file 
willingness to down tools, while amenable to the concept of working class 
solidarity, put the Defence Committee in a weak tactical position. It could 
not determine the extent of the strike, nor plan tactics as unions came 
out and went back to work in piecemeal fashion. The problems of the 
Defence Committee were made difficult too by the nature of the union move-
ment itself. For example, within the railway service, "there was a wide 
range of specialised and dependent skills, each represented by a separate 
7 
union". That is, there existed a basic interdependence of work roles. 
Different crafts were represented by different unions and indirectly, this 
led to an interdependence within unionism too. Thus, if one union went 
out on strike, workmen from another union would become idle. This principle 
spread to unions outside the service. Such was the case with the Miners' 
Federation. The miners were idle from the beginning of the strike. J.B. 
Holme reported that: 
6. J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p. 10a 
7. Dan Coward "Crime and Punishment", Strikes ed. J. Iremonger, J. Merritt 
G. Osborne p.64. 
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"Coledale, Scarborough, Coalcliff and Scarborough 
Junction collieries and the Metropolitan Mine at 
Helensburgh were all idle on the 6th August as a 
result of their dependence upon the railways for 
rolling stock and transit." 8 
Other mines, with their own rolling stock and transit facilities 
remained at work. Mines in the northern district also were idle, because 
of the failure of the train services. With the shortage of materials, 
works in Lithgow closed down and more men were made idle. The strike spread 
almost involuntarily beyond the Railway Service. 
The strike became official in the Southern mining district when the 
Defence Committee declared all coal being used by the Railway Commissioners 
9 
as "black". At Bulli, the men refused to work because an employee had 
travelled by train after the railway strike had been declared, which was 
anathema to the principles of unionism. Mines in the northern district 
too were idle at this time and the miners formally joined the strike through 
solidarity with other unions. All coal mines in New South Wales were 
idle by the 8th of August. 
From this point on, the strike became complex as it spread quickly, 
and the rapidity of the events occtirring caused much confusion. But it 
was the strength of the "sympathy" principle that enabled the strike to 
gather momentum. 
On the 9th August, wharf labourers in Sydney held a stop-work meeting 
and resolved that they would not resume work unless the Government 
immediately withdrew the cards objected to by the railway employees. 
8. J.B. Holme op. cit. p.11a 
9. This was on the 6th August. J.B. Holme op. cit. p. 10a. 
10. J.B. Holme op. cit. p. 11a 
11. S.M.H. 10th August 1917 
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Trolley dragmen and carters, in the meantime, refused to handle goods 
because it was the duty of wharf labourers. On the 11th, the Defence 
Committee declared all wheat and floixr arriving by train to be "black". 
Because of the wharf labourers' strike, the seamen joined on the 12th 
August and ship painters the next day. By the 15th most employees of the 
fuel, food and transport industries were on strike, severely paralyzing 
13 much of the State's industry. At the peak, some 68,000 men were on strike. 
The Defence Committee made some bad blunders early in the strike. 
Its aim had been to limit the dispute to those unions affected by the card 
issue directly. However, in its effort to paralyze rail transport, it chose 
to declare coal "black" first, and then later to declare wheat and flour 
"black". Unfortunately this move did not have the desired effect. Instead 
of crippling train services, it brought a number of unions into the dispute 
which in reality had no part in it. It simply served to cloud the issue, 
and made the Committee's task of co-ordinating strike activities more 
difficult. Kavanagh realised the weakness of the position of the strikers, 
but with the Defence Committee swelling each day with representatives of 
striking workers, there was little he could do but continue to give tacit 
support to the strike. A.C. Willis, the secretary of the Australasian 
Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, and the Central Council of the 
Federation were particularly conscious of the weak position of the miners. 
At the time of the strike, there were large stockpiles of coal at grass, 
and if the Government could keep even minimal transport services operating. 
12. J.B. Holme op. cit. p.14a 
13. Estimates of this figure varied depending on whether official 
or union sources were used. This figure is about an average. 
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the position of the Miners Federation would be weak."""̂  In addition, the 
miners had received a very good award in 1916, and involvement in the strike 
would give the impression of contrariness more so since the Card System 
did not concern the miners. Willis stated that the miners 
"... had absolutely no quarrel with the Government or 
with the colliery proprietors at present. They had a 
three year agreement, and as far as possible the men 
would abide by it. The position of the coalminers in 
relation to the present trouble was almost entirely 
due to circumstances over which they had no control. 
Work would resume immediately the railway trouble was 
settled."15 
Willis was responsible for some negotiating with the Government about terras 
1 5 
for a resumption of work, but his offer was refused. Mr. Morris, secretary 
of the Waterside Workers' Federation, faced similar problems when the strike 
extended to a number of major ports throughout Australia. The Committee 
of Management, the central authority of the W.W.F. which was based in 
Melbourne, had little control over the actions of the various branches. 
When firstly the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association applied to 
have Preference clauses struck from the award, and then the Federal Govern-
ment applied for de-registration of the union, the Committee of Management 
was forced to amend the rules of the W.W.F. empowering them to fine or 
expel any members failing to obey the instructions of the Committee of 
17 Management. This was done in accordance with directives from Mr. Justice 
Higgins, who was concerned that the Committee could not induce the men to 
return to work. 
14. R. Gollan The Coalminers of New South Wales (Melbourne 1953) p.153. 
15. South Coast Times 10th August, 1917. 
16. S.M.H. 9th August, 1917 
17. Minutes, Committee of Management, 31st August, 24th September, 1917. 
18. Minutes, Special meeting of Committee of Management, 11th October, 1917. 
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It is vital to note here, that while shipping was tied up in a number 
of ports for certain period during the strike, there were still attempts 
being made by the W.W.F, and other unions to assist the war effort. One 
such port was Port Pirie which was an important one since a bulk of the 
munitions needed for the war were shipped from there. The Committee of 
Management insisted thafthe members of the Port Pirie branch handle all 
cargoes necessary for the production of munitions to carry on the war 
against the enemies of England".-"-̂  Again, on the 17th September, a 
meeting of representative from a number of unions moved the following 
resolution: 
"Recognising that the continuous production of lead at the 
Port Pirie Lead and Zinc Smeltery is vital to the Cause of 
Great Britain and the Allies in the War, it is recommended that: 
1. These works be declared immune from participation 
in any labour trouble or sympathy strike during 
the period of the war ... 
2. In order to ensure continuous operations at the 
smelters, arrangements be made for producing all 
coke and coal required, transporting it to Port 
Pirie and unloading it there by union labour, and 
the unions concerned agree to find the labour 
required for this purpose..." 20 
Evidently, there were unionists who were concerned that the war effort 
should not be hindered by disputes in these important areas. 
Nevertheless, the Nationalist Government showed from the outset that 
it was prepared to take a hard line with the strikers. Having failed to 
induce the men to go back to work with his offer of an inquiry after three 
months, Fuller issued the following statement: 
19. Minutes, ibid 8th September, 1917. 
20. Minutes, ibid 17th September, 1917. The agreement was signed by 
the following union representatives; Grayndler, A.W.U.: Thornton. 
A.S.E.: Cremer, W.W.F.: Pearce, F.E.D.F.E.: Smith, A.B.L.F.: 
Johnson, F.B.F.: Wilson, F.I.A. 
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"After Friday next, no workman will go back on his old 
status. The men who stand by the Government in this 
crisis will be amply protected, and will receive and 
maintain seniority in the future. The men who refuse 
to return will lose the special rights and privileges 
which they now enjoy as employees of the State. If 
the strike does not terminate before ordinary working 
time on Friday next, the Government will utilise the 
offers of services already made and will call for 
volunteers to assist in running the services of this 
State." 21 
Mr. Fuller next indicated that unions, as they existed, were not appropriate, 
and more loyal unions would be created: 
"All Unionists who volunteer for work will be accepted 
as Unionists, and will be enrolled as members of the 
new unions registered under the Trades Unions' Acts."22 
23 
This, he claimed, showed that the "Government is not against the Unions". 
The crucial period of the strike was in the first few days. It was 
evident almost from the start that the strike would not have the full 
support of all the workmen in the Service. Some trains and trams ran 
every day. This, together with the number of volunteers applying for work 
every day, must have heartened the Government. The call for volunteers 
was most successful. The Government had advertised for experienced people 
to operate the services: 
"Engine drivers, Engineers, Firemen, Mechanics and others 
necessary for maintaining railway and other traffic, 
and the distribution of food supplies are invited to 
offer their services. If they desire to stay in the 
Government service, they will be left in that service. 
All men capable of assisting are invited to communicate 
with the Government." 24 
21. S.M.H. 8th August, 1917 
22. From the Sunday Times, 12th August, 1917. Quoted from J.B. Holme, 
op. cit. p.82a 
23. ibid. 
24. S.M.H. 8th August, 1917. 
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Many people did volunteer but the quality of some of these was some-
times questionable, since many were unable to pass the basic physical 
fitness tests required by the Department. Jack Lang, M.L.A., observed: 
"The Railway Commissioner, with the support of the National 
Government, has gone right back upon his departmental 
policy, and today men who were removed because of their 
failure to pass the eyesight test are finding employment in 
positions which involve the lives of thousands of travellers". 
To these volunteers were added inexperienced schoolboys and students from 
Sydney University. It was a calculated gamble to employ such recruits, 
but it paid off for the Government as train services improved slightly 
each day. That the Government was able to draw so many volunteers was 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, it was a reflection of the high 
unemployment at the time, and men were willing to work under almost any 
circumstances. Secondly, the strike showed that support for the war was 
still evident amongst the younger people of the community. 
On Monday the 13th August, all strikers who did not return to work 
were formally dismissed from the Service. This, Fuller explained, 
involved "the forfeiture of all their rights under the Superannuation 
26 
Act". At this time, the Government made applications to the Industrial 
Court "to cancel the registration of all unions on strike, as well as 
27 
their awards". 
To ensure that the Government could keep central control of State 
services, various proclamations were issued. One gave the Government 
the power to assume control over all kind of motor vehicles, another gave 
25. N.S.W.P.D. (Second Series) Vol. LXVII, p.451 
26. S.M.H. 10th August, 1917. 
27. ibid. According to the Striker, when unions were de-registered 
they came "within the purview of the Unlawful Associations Act". 
(13th August, 1917). Unionists insisted that this situation had 
been deliberately created by the Nationalists. 
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the Government the power to take all coal in trucks and at grass. 
Next, the Government assumed control of all the mines. Acts of Parliament 
enabled the Government to supply inexperienced labour in the coal mines, 
29 and also to control gas cons\imption. In mid-August, the Federal 
Government intervened on behalf of the Government of New South Wales. 
New regulations were added to the War Precautions Act and made interference 
30 
with shipping or shearing procedures illegal. The latter was particularly 
effective because it made certain that the powerful A.W.U. would not join 
the strike. In addition to the regulations, the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, 
established a National Service Bureau which recruited more volunteer labour 
to load ships and to work the mines. 
With plenty of volunteers and most services operating, the railway 
strike was virtually over by the end of August. To hasten the end, the 
government had the most prominent leaders of the unions arrested and charged 
with conspiracy. First, William Daly of the Seamen's Union was arrested. 
A few days later, Kavanagh, Thompson and Willis were arrested and later, 
31 
Buckley, too, was charged. This virtually deprived the strike of any 
28. See Appendices nos. 26 and 27 in J.B. Holme, op. cit., p.103a. 
29. J.B. Holme, op.cit. Appendix 33, the Coalmines Proclamation Act, 1917; 
and Appendix 34, the Electrical Lighting and Gas Emergency Act, 1917, 
p. 106a. 
30. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. Labour and Industrial 
Branch Report No. 8 (July, 1918) p.125) 
31. The charge of "conspiracy" is interesting. The original charge of the 
I.W.W. Twelve - treason - had been changed to conspiracy because it was 
easier to prove. All that has to be established is an agreement between 
the two parties to the conspiracy to do something unlawful. (See I. Turner, 
Sydney's Burning, p.49). The charges against the strike leaders were 
not heard until after the strike was defeated and all were acquitted. 
The men were probably arrested on these charges for political gain, 
to give credence to the Government's allegation of conspiracy, and 
also to deprive the strike of its leaders. 
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leadership and the men had little option but to negotiate a settlement. 
This was achieved on the 8th September and by the 10th men were applying 
for re-employment. So ended the railway section of the strike. 
The Government's uncompromising stance during the strike showed an 
inclination to fight the unions to the finish and force them into a 
unconditional surrender, but it seems a strange course of action for a 
Government committed to winning the war, to expend so much time and money 
hindering the war effort. At no time did the Government enter into any 
serious n^otktions with the intention of reaching a quick and equitable 
settlement. Even when the Lord Mayor of Sydney and some notable church 
leaders offered to act as mediators, they were brushed aside with curt 
refusals. The Government even refused to have further dealings with the 
Defence Committee. Final negotiations were left to J.B. Holme, the 
Industrial Commissioner for the State, but even then final endorsement 
was left to the Government. Naturally, the Government's actions were 
wholly approved of by the various employer organisations. After the 
collapse of the railway strike, workers in other industries were left to 
negotiate their own terms of settlement with respective employers, but 
33 
once again Governmental involvement was evident. Perhaps Kavanagh best 
summed up the debacle for the unions, when in his report he concluded that: 
"Prior to the strike. Trades Unionism had reached the 
highest pinnacle it had ever reached in this country. 
It took just twenty-seven years of hard work to bring 
it to that state of perfection. It was built up by 
arbitration and knocked down in twenty-seven days by 
direct action." 34 
32. See Appendix I for the terms of settlement. 
33. The Government largely determined the conditions for the re-employment 
of the coalminers and the settlement of that dispute, and also accepted 
the development of bureaux on the wharves. This will be discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
on Labour Council of New South Wales, Report, p.18 
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As the role of the I.W.W. in the strike, and allegation of a con-
spiracy to threaten the Nationalist Government, little can be added. By 
August, the I.W.W. as an organisation was almost defunct. When the strike 
broke out, the remainder of tlie leaders were arrested. As Tom Barker tells, 
"soon the Government was picking us up and putting us behind bars" because 
"Hughes was going to have another crack at Conscription later in the year 
35 
and he wanted us out of the way for that". The last issue of Direct 
Action even carried a criticism of the strike and its leaders: 
"We must have scientific organisation which means all 
workers in the one industry in the one union, and all 
industries linked up into one concrete body of the 
working class with a general Executive Committee 
controlling the whole dispute ... 
Almost a score of different unions are on strike, and 
each union seems to be trying to settle the troiibe 
in its own little way ... This very lax and inefficient 
system only spreads discontent among the men, and they 
at last become tired of hanging around doing nothing, and 
getting dissatisfied, defeat will follow." 36. 
It was,in fact, more than a mere criticism. It was related to the very 
core of I.W.W. ideology. 
35. E.C. Fry, op. cit. p.31 
36. Direct Action, 18th August, 1917, 
42. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Aftermath of the Strike 
The aftermath of the strike revealed the full intent of the National-
ists and the employers to punish the unionists for their part in the strike, 
E.J. Kavanagh commented in apparent bitterness that 
the employers, backed up by the Government, are 
taking full advantage of the surplus labour, and 
hungry unemployed, and are 'putting the boots in' 
with a vengeance, regardless of the misery and 
suffering of the innocent women and children. 
Never in the history of Australia has there been 
such callous vindictiveness shown towards the 
workers excepting perhaps in the convict days." 
The punishments meted out to the unionists were severe, and left a residue 
of bitterness that survived for many years. The way in which the Government 
of New South Wales handled the strike and the events immediately after, 
came under the scrutiny of a Royal Commission in 1922, and it was then 
that many irregularities and illegalities surfaced. 
The methods adopted by the Government of New South Wales during the 
strike raised a number of matters which showed that these actions were 
legally questionable, but were decisive in the outcome of the strike. 
Under the existing Railway Act, ministers of the Government had no legal 
powers to involve themselves in any relationships between the Railway 
Commissioners and their employees unless they passed a validating Act 
of Parliament. Since no such Act was ever passed, "there was no legal 
foundation for any of the promises made by Ministers in their capacity as 
Ministers, as distinguished from persons acting on behalf of the 
1. Labour Council of New South Wales, Report, p. 18 
43. 
2 
Commissioners". Furthermore, the power to make proclamations under the 
"extraordinary powers" should have been exercised by Executive Government, 
not by Cabinet alone, and public records should have been kept in approp-
riate Departments of any acts of intervention of the Executive Government. 
Mr. Justice Edmunds, presiding over the Royal Commission in 1922, was 
"unable to find any records except so-called Proclamations and documents 
3 
in Holmes' report". Thus he concluded that the powers assumed by the 
Government of New South Wales were invalid. 
This was significant because it meant that promises made by Acting 
Premier Fuller, such as the promise made on the 12th August, that 
volunteers would be enrolled as members of new unions registered under the 
Trades Union Act, enabled him to use volunteers to break the strike, but 
it was one which, in Mr. Justice Edmunds' words, "he had no legal authority 
to make". In other words, he took decisive actions which helped to 
defeat the strike, but which were illegal. The Government, too, took over 
negotiations with the Defence Committee for a return to work. So the 
Commissioners were committed to taking actions during the strike, and 
enacting the settlement proposals when they were barely consulted in the 
5 
matter. Thus, when the unions accepted the proposals presented by Mr. Holme, 
2. Report cf the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Administration, 
Control, and Economy of the Railway and Tramway Services of New South 
Wales, N.S.W.P.P. (Second Session), 1922, Vol. 3, p.xxxix 
3. ibid. p. xxxvi 
4. ibid. p. xxxix 
5. ibid. p. XXV. Mr. Fraser claimed that the Government had not consulted 
with him at all, but was found to be lying when Commissioner Fox's 
diary showed that they had met with Government Ministers on the night 
the settlement proposals were drawn up on the 8th September. 
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the Commissioners felt bound to carry out the proposals "according to the 
interpretation which the Government put on it".^ It was concluded by 
H.V. Evatt, acting on behalf of the men at the Edmunds' Commission, the 
"political pressure was exercised on the Railway Commissioners by the 
Nationalist Government and the Nationalist Party"."̂  
There is evidence whick. shows that the Government had intentions 
early in the strike of destroying existing unions and creating new unions. 
This at least was the case with unions whose members were employed by the 
government. On the 10th of August, at a meeting with the Heads of 
Branches, Mr. Fraser suggested that, while all men should belong to a 
union "no man employed by the Piiblic Service of the State shall be a member 
8 of any union affiliated with unions outside of the Government Service". 
At a later meeting, Fraser told the Heads that "the Government had no 
intention at all of having one big Public Service Union, but they do desire 
that the railway and tramway men should belong to various Public Service 
Unions - Craft Unions and that sort of thing". To achieve this, Fraser 
went on, "the Government seems to think it might be of some advantage if 
we allocated certain individuals to work amongst the men to see if any 
g 
such unions could be formed or some existing unions wiped in their membership". 
5. ibid. p.XXV 
7. H.V. Evatt, The 1917 Strike and the Aftermath (Sydney, 1924) p.8. 
8. Edmunds' Commission p.xxiv. Mr. Fraser was evidently aware of Government 
policy regarding the strike, and possibly sympathetic with the National-
ists' policies generally. One Labor M.L.A., Mr. McGirr, had accused 
Mr. Fraser of partisanship during the strike. He further alleged that 
during the Conscription Referendum, Mr. Fraser had sent "Yes" pamphlets 
throughout the State. N.S.W.P.D.(Second Series) Vol. LXVII, p.521 
9. Evatt,op. cit. p.9 
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This was consistent with statements that Fuller had made himself that "all 
unionists who volunteer will be enrolled as members of new unions, registered 
under the Trade Union Act". ° And so, the Government of New South Wales 
set out to create new Government-sponsored trade unions. 
The first stage was the de-registration of the existing unions. All 
the unions with members working for the Railways and Tramways Department 
had their registrations cancelled on the 23rd August. Others were de-
registered progressively throughout the rest of the year."̂ """ The applications 
were made mainly in the names of the Ministry for Labour and Industry, 
1 2 
and the Railway Commissioners for New South Wales. At a subsequent 
meeting of the Railway Commissioners, a number of men considered to be suit-
able were selected from amongst the employees to carry on a campaign in the 
Railway Service for the formation of new unions and the extinction of old 
13 
ones. For this, they were paid handsome wages and given free passes. 
However, on their time sheets, these men were shown as having been performing 
their ordinary duties, or being engaged in special duties. There was nothing 
to indicate that these men were involved in organising new unions. When 
questioned. Fuller denied any knowledge of the activities of men with 
special passes organising new unions and to this, Mr. Justice Edmunds replied 
14 that Fuller's answer was a "deliberate attempt to suppress the truth". 
Evatt, in commenting on the formation of the bogus unions, concluded that 
10. The Striker (issued by the authority of the Unions' Defence Committee) 
Sydney, 13th August, 1917. 
11. From the "Review of Industrial Dislocations", N.S.W. Industrial Gazette 
Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1918, pp. 143-145. See Appendix H for details. 
12. A number of unions whose members were employed in private industry were 
de-registered as well, upon application from thei respective employers. 
These cases will be dealt with later in the chapter. 
13. Edmunds' Commission, p.lxviii 
14. ibid. p. Ixviii 
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"all the elements of conspiracy were present. There was 
agreement between the Government and the Commissioners. 
There was secrecy. Deception was practised in Parliament. 
The genuine unions were prevented from ascertaining the 
truth."15. 
Mr, Justice Edmunds did not necessarily agree that a conspiracy did exist, 
but he did condemn the actions of the Government and the Commissioners 
as a matter of policy: 
"... any action of the kind taken is sure to be regarded 
as a covert attempt to ensnare the employees into a 
union that will be more solicitous for the interests of 
the employers than for those of the workmen." 16 
At least three new unions were formed in the Railway Service. These were 
the Australian Railways Union (which still survives today); the United Crown 
and Railway Services Association; and the Association of Employees (Mech-
anical Branch) of the New South Wales Government Railways."'"'̂  
The railway section was settled when the Defence Committee agreed to 
18 
proposals put by J.B. Holme. The settlement was actually in two parts -
a written agreement of seven clauses, but also a nimiber of verbal undertakings 
on the part of the Government. Two clauses of the written agreement dealt 
specifically with allowing unions to take their grievances to the Court of 
Industrial Arbitration, if in the jurisdiction of the Court. The Government 
agreed to amend an Act to give the Court the necessary jurisdiction to 
deal with grievances. This was a necessary concession. Since the Card 
System was not a matter of wages or conditions, the Court was not able to 
arbitrate during the strike. The Government, intent on forcing a total 
15. Evatt, op.cit. p.10 
16. Edmunds' Commission, p.lxix 
17. Both A.R.T.S.A. (Minutes, 24th September, 1917) and the New South Wales 
Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Society (Minutes, 27th September, 1917 
and 11th October, 1917) stressed their opposition to the registration 
of these unions but were unsuccessful. 
18. For the terms of the settlement, see Appendix I. 
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surrender by the unions, did not want the unions to arbitrate, so took no 
steps to amend the existing legislation. Clauses 4 and 5 theoretically 
then gave the unions a chance to air their grievances at the Court of 
Industrial Arbitration, so could possible prevent similar strikes occurring 
in the future. Yet, in one case, that of the Locomotive Engine Drivers, 
Firemen and Cleaners' Association, when the union brought its grievances 
to the Court, counsel for the Railway Commissioners objected to the union 
appearing because it was de-registered. This was after the union had been 
given a written undertaking that it could appear before the Court. 
It was Clause 7 that was most flagrantly abused by the Government. 
That clause stated that "it is mutually understood that work shall be 
resumed without resentment, and employment offered without vindictiveness". 
In fact, wholesale victimisation did take place. "Black lists" were drawn 
up, by men who were in no position to make judgements. It was "an open 
season for vindictive informers."^ One list of undesirables was drawn up 
by Mr. Weaver, M.L.A., Minister of Railways and long-time critic of the 
I.W.W. Another was compiled by Driver Piper, a loyalist who had opposed 
were 
the strike. These lists/presented to the Heads of Branches, who refused 
re-employment to men whose names appeared on the lists. Mr, Justice 
Edmunds concluded that those men whose names appeared on these lists were 
"... men who had given unsatisfactory work in the past, had 
taken a prominent part in carrying on the strike, men who 
were suspected of sympathising with the I.W.W., men who 
had been guilty of intimidation of loyalists or other covert 
acts during the course of the strike, and slow and indiff-
erent workers". 21 
19. Evatt, op.cit. p.15 
20. Gollan, op.cit. p.154 
21. Edmunds' Commission, p.xxviii 
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On this basis, thousands of men were refused re-employment. Those who 
were re-employed were obliged to sign forms titled "Form of application 
for re-employment of men who left duty on strike". Those men, although 
employed, forfeited all their seniority and superannuation rights. Ben 
Chifley was one of these men. Before the strike, he had been employed as 
a driver in the railway service. After the strike, he was not re-employed. 
He appealed and was finally re-appointed as a fireman. He shared the 
bitterness of his fellow workers, but it also changed the course of his 
life: 
"I should not be a member of this Parliament today 
if some tolerance had been extended to the men who 
took part in the strike of 1917. All that harsh and 
oppressive treatment did as far as I was concerned 
was to transform me, with the assistance of my colleagues, from 
an ordinary engine driver into the Prime Minister of this 
country". 23. 
It was, in all, a humiliating the bitter experience for all those men who 
had gone on strike. To ensure that volunteers and loyalists would get 
preference in employment and promotion, the Railway Commissioners modified 
the basic eyesight and hearing standards for volunteers. Even then, when 
a number of volunteers were dismissed for failing to achieve even the 
minimum standards, Mr. Holman exerted pressure on the Commissioners to 
keep the volunteers employed because, he claimed "any dismissal of a 
siibstantial number of loyalists at the present time will have a very serious 
effect on certain delicate matters of public policy that are new being 
24 determined". Thus, volunteers who were found to be medically unfit were 
22. J.B. Holme The N.S.W. Strike Crisis, 1917 Appendix No. 59, p.125a 
23. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley (London, 1961) p.11. 
24. Edmunds' Commission, p.lxxiv 
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retained in the Service, while some former employees remained out of 
work for years later. The Government of New South Wales was responsible 
for gross violations of the agreements, which confirmed their intentions 
of crushing organised unionism connected with the Public Service. 
The victimisation was not confined to the railway workers. Similar 
actions were taken by the Government on the coalfields. The Government 
of New South Wales took over control of the collieries on the 23rd August. 
Asked if the proclamation to seize the coalmines was valid, Mr. Justice 
Higgins replied that it was "wholly invalid, not worth the paper it was 
written on, and it was not supported by the prerogative of the Crown, or 
by the Crown's right of eminent domain on which the proclamation expressly 
25 
purported to be based". Nevertheless, with the assistance of the Federal 
Government, which established the National Service Bureaux, the New South 
Wales Government was able to keep the mines working with volunteer labour. 
It was necessary to amend the Coal Mines Regulation Act to enable non-
27 
skxlled labour to be used in the mines. With the help of volunteer 
labour, the Government was able to produce sufficient coal, and this put 
the Miners' Federation in a weak bargaining position. The Government's 
terms of settlement were harsh - no mines were to be treated as "black", 
loyalists and volunteers would be retained ahead of strikers in employment 
and no guarantees of re-employment would be offered to the striking miners. 
This prompted the Federation to state 
"We are fully convinced, from the Government's latest 
proposals, that the Government has no desire to effect 
a settlement except on conditions which we consider 
humiliating the degrading". 28 
25. S.M.H. 24th August, 1917. 
26. See J.B. Holme, op.cit. p.65a. The High Court has been asked if the 
proclamation taking over control of the coal mines within the State 
during the strike was valid. 
27. J.B. Holme, op. cit. 
28. S.M.H. 14th September, 1917. 
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The Government pressed further and made the terms more severe so that 
"members of the Coal Miners' Federation(would) agree to work with local 
workers, and to admit them to membership of the Federation if they so 
29 
desired". Eventually, the miners were forced to accept the Governments 
terms and return to work. Lists of undesirables were again drawn up, 
30 
and these men victimised as the railway men had been before, so that 
loyalists and volunteers could be kept in their employment. 
Private industry was equally harsh in its dealings with the strikers. 
Companies like B.H.P., C.S.R., Schweppes and others sought and gained 
31 
de-registration of unions to which their workers belonged, and imposed 
harsh terms on them. These included extracting promises of supporting 
employer-sponsored unions^ For example, during an inquiry into a number 
of grievances of fell mongers and wool sorters, and wool and basil workers 
before Mr. Justice Heydon, it was revealed that the employers required the 
workers to sign application forms setting out certain conditions which they 
were to observe: 
"3. The employee shall not oppose any application for 
de-registration of the Wool and Basil Workers' 
Association of New South Wales, and shall resign 
his membership thereof, or of any other industrial 
union. State or Federal, if when called upon by 
the employer to do so. 
4. The employee shall, when called upon, join and 
support such new unions as the employers shall 
approve". 32 
29. J.B. Holme, op. cit. p.44a, see Appendix J. 
30. One of these victimised miners was interviewed by the author. He 
was refused re-employment at the Bulli mine, and was out of work 
for 18 months until re-employed at Richmond Main. Taped interview 
with Mr. Jim Seamer, Thirroul, N.S.W., 28th September, 1977. 
31. See Appendix H. 
32. Edmunds' Commission, p.lxxi 
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Employers probably felt that they had the support of the Government and 
the Courts in this actions. 
The case of the Waterside Workers' Federation was a little different 
from that of most other unions. In the first place, the watersiders 
were working under a Federal award, and so came under the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Secondly, the 
W.W.F. was attacked from two sides. The Commonwealth Steamship Owners' 
Association sought to have preference clauses withdrawn from the award, 
and Hughes sought to have the union de-registered.. Both cases were heard 
by Mr. Justice Higgins. The Steamship Owners' Association applied to 
have the "preference" clauses struck from the award because it "embarrassed 
33 
them ito making use of outside labovir". This would enable the shipping 
companies to use non-union labour. Mr. Justice Higgins did strike out 
the preference clause, but suggested that the union should alter its rules 
to give greater power to the Committee of Management, and ordered the 
34 
Federation to pay a bond as a guarantee of no stoppages. With the loss 
of the preference clause, the Federation came under fire. Bureaux were 
established by the shipowners to replace the old mustering places. At the 
bureau, a worker, if approved of by the employer, was given a disc which 
enabled him to work. Naturally, preference was given to volunteer or 
non-union labour, because "it was considered desirable that the members 
35 
of the wharf labourers' unions should not be allowed to swamp the wharves". 
33. H.B. Higgins A New Province for Law and Order (London 1958) p. 65 
34. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, W.W.F. vs. 
Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and others. Decision of 
Higgins pp. 5-10. 
35. Minutes, Australasian Steamship Owners' Federation, 24th October, 1917. 
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Workers joining new employer-sponsored unions would naturally get discs 
ahead of Federation members. Mr. Justice Higgins noted that "even 
certain soldiers, competent waterside workers, members of the Federation, 
were all refused employment through one of the Sydney bureaux, unless 
they joined a new union formed under the influence of the employers".'̂ '̂ ' 
Federation members were only to be employed if there was a shortage of 
labour on the wharves. Employers, in some cases, also felt confident in 
attacking existing working conditions. The Hobart branch of the W.W.F. 
for example wrote to the General Secretary, Mr. Morris, complaining that 
"Huddart Parker Ltd. (had) taken away ... all the domestic 
rules granted ... by the Conciliation Board .,, and Calso) 
all local conditions not mentioned in the award or order".38 
The branch requested that the case be put to Mr. Justice Higgins. Victim-
isation on the wharves continued up until 1925 when the bureaux were 
finally abandoned. 
It was Hughes, however, a former president of the W.W.F. that threat-
ened to do the most harm to the Federation. Under the provisions of the 
War Precautions Act, Hughes persuaded the Governor - General to sign a 
regulation which would enable him to cancel the registration of any union 
39 
on strike. Mr. Justice Higgins did not appreciate Hughes' actions, 
stating that it seemed to say "You must cancel; for if you do not cancel, 
4o I shall myself cancel". Mr. Justice Higgins dismissed the case arguing 
36. One of these new unions was sponsored by tie New South Wales Steam Ship 
Owners' Association, and was called the permanent and Casual Waterside 
Labourers' and Stevedores' Union. See Minutes, New South Wales 
Steamship Owners' Association, 31st October, 1917. 
37. W.W.F. vs. Steamship Owners' Association, op.cit. p.8 
38. W.W.F. (Hobart) to Morris, 2nd October, 1917. Records of W.W.F., 
A.N.U. Archives. 
39. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour and Industrial 
Branch Report No. 8 (July 1918) p. 124. 
40. Higgins, op. cit. p.65. 
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that "de-registration would not free the employers of obligations as to 
wages and conditions imposed by the award", but it would free the Federation 
and its properties from liability for penalties for strikes.^^ As an 
aside, Mr. Justice Higgins, in what was probably a dig at Hughes, added 
that "the powers to cancel were not to be used as an instrument of pointless 
42 vengeance". 
This is an interesting point, in that it suggests a certain degree 
of vindictiveness in Hughes' character. Hughes had been in conflict with 
Mr. Justice Higgins since the.1916 Coal Strike when the latter refused to 
be bullied into a decision of which he did not approve. When Mr, Justice 
Higgins refused to de-register the W.W.F., Hughes was so incensed that he 
43 
contemplated having him replaced. This continued in 1917 with the 
Queensland Railway Strike (not connected with the New South Wales rail 
strike). Ryan, the Queensland Premier, asked Mr. Justice Higgins to act 
as an independent arbitrator to settle the dispute. He agreed, but thought 
that Hughes should be consulted as a matter of courtesy. Hughes did not 
give his sanction, claiming that the men had brought "into contempt the 
State Court and Government authority, dislocating industry and having no 
44 regard for the present life and death struggle in which Australia is involved." 
This made matters difficult for Ryan for no other reason than "the capacity 
45 
of Hughes for bastardry". Ryan, in reply, warned that 
41. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, W.W.F. ex parte 
Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and ex parte 
Industrial Registrar, p.4. 
42. Higgins, op. cit. p.65. 
43. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXXXIII, p. 2735 
44. D.J. Murphy, T.J. Ryan (Queensland, 1975) p.27 
45. ibid. p.271 
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"The attitude of the Prime Minister (in refusing to 
permit Judge Higgins to arbitrate) shows that he is 
determined to do all he can to prevent this Government 
from bringing about industrial peace in this State. 
The^workers of Queensland should wake up the situation 
their political opponents are endeavouring to bring about". 
The result was that Ryan and Hughes began to feud over the New South Wales 
strike. Ryan was urging Fuller to negotiate a settlement quickly, because 
it seemed that the strike would spread to Queensland, since men were 
refusing to handle goods consigned to Queensland at the border. Hughes 
threatened to use provisions under the War Precautions Act to force 
Queensland workers to carry all goods. There is an interesting contrast 
here between Ryan, Hughes and Fuller. Ryan constantly negotiated his 
settlements, while Hughes and Fuller were intent on using coercion. 
Hughes, in June 1917 made a proposal to A.S.E. which would promote 
ship-building as part of the war effort. Hughes asked the A.S.E. for its 
co-operation on a number of matters - the prevention of stoppages due to 
trade disputes, the use of piecework systems, which Hughes believed would 
47 
help to increase production, and the dilution of labour if necessary. 
Hughes made it clear that all proposals would have to be accepted. In 
July, the A.S.E. held ballots to decide, and various branches decided that 
48 
they would accept "continuity", but not "piecework" and "dilution". 
So the shipbuilding program did not eventuate. Hughes had an obsession to 
win the war, and did not look kindly upon people who interfered with the 
war effort. His extremely partisan and decisive actions in the 1917 strike, 
could possibly be partly attributed to his anger at the A.S.E. decision. 
46. The Worker, 6th September, 1917 
47. K.D. Buckley The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, 1852-1920. 
(Canberra 1970) p.255. 
48. Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Minutes, Commonwealth Council, 
2nd August, 1917. 
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Certainly, the Watersiders' strike did infuriate him since it tied up 
the ports and prevented essential shipping services from continuing. Hughes 
confirmed his desire to maintain the war effort and, if necessary, to 
punish unions who did not contribute when he stated that "Strikes in 
time of war are a crime against society". 
What is apparent from the evidence quoted in this chapter is that the 
Nationalist Government of New South Wales violated agreements to achieve 
their goals of destroying unionism. The win-the-war Party wanted to 
create an industrial situation where unions were subservient to the whims 
of the Goverim:ient, and the country as a whole could concentrate on winning 
the war. They used the most coercive methods to crush and humiliate 
the unions, and some of their activities were later judged as illegal. With 
the help of Hughes, whose involvement was decisive the Nationalists achieved 
a success that was almost complete. 
49. S.M.H. 11th August, 1917. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A Government Conspiracy? 
It has already been demonstrated that the Nationalists of New South 
Wales, together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, and various employer 
groups made an extensive and auccessful attack on trade unionism in 1917. 
All agreed too that the strikers needed to be punished. In 1918 the Railway 
Commissioners informed the Minister for Public Works in a letter that 
"It was recognised by the.Government and the Commissioners 
that some punishment should be meted out to those men who 
defied them and went out on strike."1 
Hughes stated that "strikes in the time of war are a crime against society", 
2 
and strikers had to be punished for their crime. The difficulty is in 
Government 
establishing whether or,not the Nationalist/of New South Wales, the Federal 
Nationalist Government and various employers engaged in a "conspiracy" to 
deliver this punishment, and for the piirpose of destroying unionism or at 
least in some way changing or influencing its course. To do so, it would 
be necessary to show that there was a pre-arranged scheme developed by these 
groups for that purpose. It is unlikely that such a scheme was ever 
developed, or even that it could be, for it is difficult to imagine, as 
Childe points out, how the Government or the Employers' Federation could 
3 
"foresee the remifications which the strike could assume" . Marxist 
interpretations do perhaps provide a scope for conspiracies of this natixre. 
One such interprepatation is that capitalist power actually exists in 
1. Edmunds Commission, p.lxxv 
2. S.M.H. 11th August, 1917. This theme of "Crime and Punishment" is 
central to Dan Coward's article on the strike in Strikes (ed) J. Iremonger, 
J. Merritt, G. Osborne (Angus & Robertson, 1973). 
3. Childe, op. cit. p.164 
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state apparatuses, "determined by the social relations of production" 
and "conspiracies occur when ruling in the old way becomes difficult".^ 
In other words, according to McQueen, conspiracies "attempt that the normal 
functioning of state apparatuses cannot achieve, either at all, or as 
effectively, or as speedily".^ In the case of New South Wales in 1917, 
an unprovoked attack on the trade union movement could lead to a massive 
destruction of unionism and the wholesale victimisation of its members. 
The weakness of this argument is firstly, that it cannot be shown that 
there was premeditation for such a course; secondly, if the workers had 
accepted the Card System,it is possible that the strike would not have 
occurred. 
Yet there were those in the labour movement who insisted that there 
had indeed been prior agreements reached to destroy trade unionism. 
Senator Gardiner alleged that the strike "was a pre-arranged attack on 
unionism" and argued that 
"whether it was pre-arranged or not - although I believe 
it was - it is a fact that the Win-the-War Government 
of New South Wales and the Federal Win-the-War Government 
have made a successful attack upon our unions". 6 
T. J. Ryan, the Premier of Queensland, on the same occasion claimed 
that "... the members of the de-registered unions ... believe that the 
Commonwealth Government was behind the employers in the recent great indust-
7 
rial strike..." ' The Unions' Defence Committee alleged that "the 
introduction of time cards was pruposely engineered to create an upheaval 
4. H. McQueen, "None Dare Call It Conspiracy", Politics. Vol. XI, No. 1, 
May 1976, pp. 24-25. 
5. ibid. p.25. 
5. Report of the Proceedings of the Conference Convened by His Excellency 
the Governor-General on the Siibject of Securing Reinforcements under 
the Voluntary System for the Australian Imperial Force now Serving 
Abroad, Melbourne, April 1918. Commonwealth Parlimentary Papers, 
Session 1917-18-19, Vol. IV, p.30. 
7. ibid. p.22 
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in which unions and working standards could be attacked"^. J. Lang, 
M.L.A., supported this view: 
"The Card System was not essential to the war effort. 
It was just an excuse. Holman knew that an attempt 
to force the issue would result in an upheaval. Yet 
he permitted Fuller to take over and conduct the 
campaign to break the strike as if he was engaged in 
a war against a foreign enemy".9 
Mr. Mutch, M.L.A., was also convinced that the Government and the 
Employers' Federation were determined to break uniorism. He asked 
"Why did the Chamber of Manufacturers, on the 7th of this 
month (August) hold a meeting and decide that they 
were prepared to close down the whole of the factories 
of the State and starve the people".10 
if there is no such plot. Mutch pointed out that he had obtained this 
information from the Melbourne Age, because, he claimed, newspapers in 
New South Wales had been notified not to publish damaging information. 
He concluded by accusing the Nationalists of using the political machine 
of their party to organise volunteers and "scabs" throughout the country. 
Yet another Labor M.L.A., Mr. Stuart-Robertson, also alleged a conspiracy: 
"My own conclusion is that the Chief Commissioner is 
merely the puppet of the Employers' Federation. He 
is bringing this thing to a head in the interests of 
the Employers' Federation generally for the pixrpose 
of breaking down the arbitration award where the 
award is little above the living wage".12 
Much of this is merely allegation but is must have been obvious to the 
Railway Commissioners and the Government that the introduction of time 
cards would lead to trouble, so their insistence on the implementation 
8. Quoted in K.D. Buckley, op.cit., p.252 
9. J. Lang, I Remember (Invincible Press, no date) p. 109 
10. N.S.W.P.D., (Second Series), Vol. LXVII, p.501 
11. ibid. p.501 
12. ibid. p.532 
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of the system could be considered provocative. 
Suspicions of some impending conflict between Government and labour 
existed even before the Card System was re-introduced in July 1917. 
H.E. Boote, writing in the Worker under the title "What Does It All Mean?", 
noted that 
"For some reason or other, not yet explained, the coal 
proprietors, in conjunction with the Federal Government, 
are deeply concerned lest the miners should lose a single 
day's work ... 
(The miners) do see huge stacks of coal at every available 
point of assembly in close proximity to the Railways ... 
They are told that the Empire depends on them, and the 
coal they hew from below the surface. And then they turn 
to the huge stacks lying at grass and wonder why it is, 
if the Empire needs this coal so badly, it is not going 
Empire-wards". 13 
The charge was a valid one. By using these existing stacks of coal, 
the Commissioners were able to keep rail services operating even though 
limited. The abundance of coal available to the Government also put the 
miners in a weak tactical position during the strike. 
Commenting on the passage of the amended Unlawful Associations Act, 
Boote noted the following: 
"I am absolutely convinced that the Unlawful Associations 
Bill is brought forward with the sinister object of having 
available a Coercion Act that can be used to crush out of 
existence any organised body opposed to the ruling and purpose 
of the Government. 
The amendment secured by the Labor Party, to the effect that 
the measure shall not apply to Unions registered under the 
laws, affords a certain degree of protection — 
... during the period of the war a capitalist-dominated 
government could always find a pretext for de-registration 
in time of industrial trouble, when mines might be abandoned 
or crops left iingathered, and when allegations of injury to 
property and of danger 1D scabworkers are almost invariably 
made. This measure could then be applied, and the Union or 
Unions concerned be declared unlawful, and the strikers 
brought under the harrow of coercion. ... Let the labovir 
organisations make no mistake about it - there is mischief 
brewing in Billy's pot..." 14 
13. The Worker, 12th July, 1917 
14. The Worker, 26th July, 1917 
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Boote's observations could be dismissed as mere labour fantasies, yet 
they were so prophetic. The comments were particularly pertinent 
because of the nature of the circumstances that existed at this time. 
With unemployment relatively high, the Government had, in time of 
emergency, a potential source of volunteer labour. Mr. Buckley, M.L.A., 
speaking in the Legistlative Assembly, strengthened Boote's fears: 
"... we take strong exception to the economic conscription 
that is now being introduced. Unemployment is rampant, 
and no single men can obtain positions in the Tramway or 
Railway Departments. The railway service is about to 
dismiss all single men, and in view of the dearth of 
emplojmient, it will be impossible for single men to 
exist unless they enlist". 15 
The mention of unemployment, and economic conscription is important, for 
it raised another issue which some Labor members felt was the real motive 
for the Nationalists provoking the Strike. 
The fear of conscription was very real within the labour meovement 
and it was apparent to many that there may have been some connection 
between the Strike and another attempt by the Nationalists to introduce 
conscription. Mr. McGirr, M.L.A., alleged that "behind it (the Strike) 
is a desire to break up the industrial machine so that conscription may 
-1 r^ 
be foisted upon the manhood of this country". The Annual Report of the 
P.L.L. Executive, published in December 1917, had the following to say 
about the Strike: 
15. N.S.W.P.D. (Second Series), Vol. LXVII pp.258-9. Buckley was a 
former I.W.W. and official of the Tramways Union. He was arrested 
during the strike on conspiracy charges but later was acquitted. 
His role in the strike seems to have been as a stump orator in the Domain. 
16. N.S.W.P.D., (Second Series), Vol. LXVII, p.521. McGirr also mentioned 
the "huge heaps of coal at the big country railway stations" that he 
had himself seen and which had been provided by the Commissioners 
who knew that a strike was coming on (ibid. p.523) 
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"Every siobsequent step proved that the plausible Acting-
Premier, Mr. Fuller, was simply a willing tool in the 
hands of the Employers' Federation which met daily to 
advise the Government. That the Government and the 
employers' organisations were all parties to a conspiracy 
to break the power of unionism and force conscription 
upon the working-class has been proved up to the hilt 
by the discovery of the Secret Memorandimi prepared by 
Premier Holman, and circulated among his colleagues 
prior to his departure for Great Britain". 17 
The Secret Memorandum mentioned was a startling document. It was compiled 
by Holman in February 1917, and publicly released in December 1917 on the 
eve of the second conscription referendum by opponents of the measure. It 
reviewed possible methods of improving recruitment: 
"A census should be taken of the whole of the men employed 
by the Railway Commissioners on duplication. Those who 
are unmarried and of military age should be dismissed -
not necessarily simultaneously. 
Arrangement should be made for them to be interviewed by 
recruiting sergeants, or preferably other recruiting agents. 
(He then suggested this course be applied to other 
Government departments.) 
... Most important. The employers of the State should 
be got together. They should be asked each to consider: 
1. How far single men of military age can be replaced 
by married men and men over military age. 
2. How they can be replaced by young men and boys. 
3. How far they can be replaced by women. 
4. How far they can be dispensed with altogether. 
The industries of this State should be reorganised upon 
this footing. When this is done, the employers should 
be invited to, as far as possible, dispense with men who 
ought to be defending the country."18 
Holman admitted to being the author of the memorandum, but stressed it 
was only intended to provide a few ideas for discussion in Cabinet and 
19 
the suggestions had never been implemented. Stxll,xt gave credence 
17. Quoted in Childe, op. cit., p.164 
18. This was published in theWorker, 17th December, 1917, 
19. The Worker, 17th December, 1917. 
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to Buckley's claims that the Government was forcing economic conscription 
on the workers, and in view of the events during the strike and the 
victimisation of unionists after the Strike, it was not surprising 
that a number of labour men saw the Strike as the result of a conspiracy 
to discredit and destroy the labour movement to pave the way for another 
conscription referendum. Both Hughes and Holman had, earlier in the 
year, promised that they would not seek another referendum: 
"The Government does not contemplate reviewing the 
Conscription verdict or disturbing it ..." 
(Hughes, March 1917) 
"We declare that the issue of conscription, having been 
referred to the people of Australia, and decided by them 
in the negative, is settled. We accept unreservedly the 
verdict of the people,and will give no support to any 
endeavour to again raise the question". 20 
(Holman, March 1917) 
It is possible that Hughes was under some pressure from Britain to provide 
more reinforcement s for the Western Front where losses had been high and 
21 
for this reason tried to introduce conscription again. Nevertheless, 
the connection between the Strike and conscription was reinforced, at least 
in the eyes of many in the labour movement. The Worker, under the title 
"We Told You So", re-affirmed this connection when it pointed out the 
steps that had led to the second referendum: 
"1. on the plea of economy, thousands of men were dismissed 
from the Government works all over the country, 
2. a strike was provoked in the ranks of the most loyal 
workers for the express purpose of making the industrial 
chaos as disastrous as possible, and of setting the men 
to fighting among themselves, 
3. then, right on the heels of the Government's industrial 
victory, is introduced the second referendum battle". 22 
20. Daily Telegraph, 17th March, 1917. 
21. H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, (Sydney, 1954) pointed out that 
the figures of the number of recruits required were grossly exaggerated. 
Throughout 1917, even during the strike, there was an average monthly 
recruitment of nearly 4,000 men. Evatt doubted that there was ever 
a need for conscription, p.337 
22. The Worker, 23rd November, 1917. 
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If the Nationalists had hoped to gain some political capital at the expense 
of the labour movement during the Strike, for the purpose of committing 
voters to a "Yes" vote in the referendum, they were to be disappointed. 
The measure was defeated more soundly than before. 
While such evidence exists which is damaging to the Nationalist 
Government of New South Wales, the Federal Nationalist Government and the 
various employer organisations, it is difficult to tie them together in the 
form of a conspiracy, suggested by members of the labour movement. Apart 
from the obvious emotive considerations and the political potency to be had 
from the issue, too many connections remained tenuous, and could be explained 
by coincidence. Childe claimed that the problem with the labour case was 
23 
that it tried to prove too much. This is probably the case, but it 
should be remembered that Childe did not have the advantage of reading the 
findings of the Royal Commission under Mr. Justice Edmunds. It is true 
that the latter found there was "no reasonable foundation for the charge 
of conspiracy between the Commissioner and the Government to ignore the 
24 
Terms of Settlement", but he did find it necessary to qualify this on a 
number of points. He found that several promises made to loyalists were 
illegal, that the government had "exceeded its rights in some matters, 
25 
had violated the Terms of Settlement", had "suppressed the truth". 
To make the final commitment to calling the strike a conspiracy between 
these groups is perhaps historically untenable, McQueen notwithstanding. 
What is tenable is that once the strike occurred, the Government of New 
South Wales, with the support of Hughes and the employers, decided on a 
show-down with the labour movement. With factors favouring them, they 
23. Childe, op. cit. p.164 
24. Edmunds Commission, p.lxx 
25. ibid, p.lxxxiv 
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could easily win. The Nationalists no doubt saw that there was political 
capital to be gained from the strike, and it is likely that the strike 
added to (or confirmed) their decision to hold a second referendum. The 
alliance of thought between these conservative elements in Australia would 
ensure their mutual co-operation in any crisis involving the labour 
movement. No doubt a desire for revenge for the defeat of the first 
Conscription Referendum, and a continuing committment to winning the 
war bound these groups to a course of common action and hence a total 
victory in the 1917 strike. 
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APPENDIX A 
Revenue in the Railways and Tramways Services 
(The amount of revenue available in the Service at the end of each 

























































* The column represents total expenditure costs related to concessions, 






























The hugh increases in interest payments adversely affected the revenue 
of the department and was the single largest item of expenditure. General 
costs increased largely due to the abnormal conditions of drought and war 
in the 1914-1915 period, the cost of munitions work in the Eveleigh and 
Randwick workshops in 1916, and theCoal Strike of 1916 which forced up 
the price of coal. Higher pay awards and advances also contributed to 
increasing costs. The surplus experienced in 1918, after defecits in 
1915 and 1917, was largely due to the reduction of working costs during 
the strike (fewer trains and trams ran, and the wages bill was reduced 
by more than half,lower pay awards and advances, and the increase in 
rates and fares. The surplus cannot be solely attributed to the intro-
duction of the Card System into the workshops. 
(These tables were compiled from data presented in the "Reports of the 
Chief Commissioner" (N.S.W. Government Railways and Tramways) N.S.W. 









































Mr. Fraser attributed the lower work rate recorded to four causes: 
1. misdirected effort (some work was done twice over) 
2. basic mistakes which stop things moving and cause idleness 
3. men being brought on duty too early and left on too long 
4. deliberate slow work 
(These figures are quoted from a paper presented by Mr. J. Fraser, Chief 




The Card System 
Extracts from the report of a Commission sent by the South Australian 
Government to inquire into the System of working in the N.S.W. Railway 
Workshops. This took place before the Card System was introduced in the 
Railway workshops at Randwick. Taken from a statement by Senator O'Keefe, 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, VIII, George V, Vol. LXXXIII (2nd 
Session) pp. 2424-2425. 
Senator O'Keefe: "... Major Smeaton, a well-known member of the 
South Australian Parliament, who was chairman of the Commission, asked 
'You have apparently a very perfect system of control. Now, in huge 
workshops such as you have, there are bound to be leakages somewhere. 
We would be glad if you would, for our benefit and the benefit of our 
own State, tell us where you look for those leakages; leakages which mean 
uneconomy, loss of time, loss of value through spoilt material?' 
The following answer was given by Mr. Lucy, the Chief Mechanical 
Engineer of the Eveleigh Workshops -
'So far as concerns the leakage from slow working, loss of time of any 
description, we discover by keeping a good system of accounts where the 
leakage occurs. We compare one leading hand, or chargement, and a gang 
of fifteen or twenty, with another gang of the same number doing precisely 
the same work under similar conditions, and hold the leading hand, or 
chargeman, responsible for the output. In that way we are able to discover 
eventually the individuals to whom this lack of effort can be applied, 
and we deal with them.' 
In the light of this evidence, was there any necessity for the 
introduction of the Card System in the railway workshops in New South 
Wales, especially in view of the fact that the Railways Commissioners had 
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been warned that any attempt in that direction would lead to a vast 
industrial upheaval? The report continues -
•With regard to the wastage or loss of materials, we have a system 
of watchmen and a system of detectives; also, by means of assays of 
castings made in the brass foundry and various other castings which 
contain such valuable metals as tin and copper, and less valuable 
metals, such as spelter and lead, we determine, by the amount of assay, 
the total castings coming out which contain such-and-such a proportion 
of tin, and we say, "Where is the tin consumed during the month gone to?" 
"What is the percentage of waste or losses?" In that way we can check 
any leakage.' 
'What is the result of all this care? Do you really check wastage 
and reduce to a percentage basis the loss on what you think you ought 
to achieve from all your work and that which you get?' - Yes. 
Do you think, taking the whole of your operations, that you are 
getting an efficient return for yoixr expenditure? - Oh, yes. I am quite 
confident of that; the leakage is small. 
You think that through the system of control you have the constant 
oversight of the superior officers, and under them the foremen, you are 
getting the full retixrn for the i?ates paid to the men? - Coupled with 
the system we have of issue from the stores stock and return to stores, 
both the raw materials in their unmixed conditions, forged conditions, 
and finished conditions, the disparity of losses is further reduced to 
a minimum. 
Mr. J. Gunn, a member of the Commission, asked, "Do you consider 
that you get as efficient service from the workmen employed in the 
Government workshops as private enterprise gets from employees in their 
own shops?" 
Mr. Lucie - I do. 
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APPENDIX D. 
Unions Involved in the Card System 
The Unions which met on the 30th July to appoint a deputation to the 
Commissioners to review the Card System, and sho decided on the ultimatum 
were as follows: 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
Australasian Society of Engineers 
Federated Society of Makers and Repairers of Iron and Steel Boilers, 
Vessels, Tanks, etc. 
Blacksmiths' Society of Australasia 
Electrical Trades Union of N.S.W. 
Operative Plumbers' Society of New South Wales 
Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Society of New South Wales 
New South Wales Government Tramway Employees' Union 
The New South Wales Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Service Association 
Federated Moulders' (Metal) Union of Australasia (N.S.W. Division) 
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners 
Sydney Progressive Society of Carpenters and Joiners 
Amalgamated Timber Workers' Union of Australia, N.S.W. Branch 
Federated Ironworkers, Coachmakers, and Metal Polishers 

















































»'«The figures provided are weighted averages. 
The figures for N.S.W. are shown because prices were so much higher in 
that State and because the strike occurred mainly in N.S.W. 



















































(From the Commonwealth Labour Report Nos. 2, 14) These figures are 
adapted from those quoted in I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics 















































It is significant that unemployment figures were much higher in the Eastern 
States, especially in the first two quarters of 1917, which coincided with 
labour claims of forced retrenchment or "economic conscription". Unemploy-
ment reached its peak in 1917 in the fourth quarter (October to December) 
at 7.4%. (This is taken from the Labour and Industrial Branch Report No. 8, 
July 1918, p.19, published by the Commonwealth Burear of Census and 
Statistics). 
(From the Commonwealth Labour Report Nos. 2,14) These figures are adapted 
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Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, N.S.W. District 
N.S.W. Amalgamated Rail-
way and Tramway Service 
Association. 
N.S.W. Railway Traffic 
Employees' Association 
N.S.W. Government Tramway 
Employees' Union 
N.S.W. Locomotive Engine 
Drivers, Firemen and 
Cleaners Association 
Carrington Coal and Coke 
Shipping Union 
Newcastle and District 
Trolley Draymen and 
Carters' Union 
Amalgamated Timber 
Workers' Union of 
Australia, N.S.W. 
Branch 
Pyrmont Sugar Works 
Employees' Union 
Trolley Drajnnen and 
Carters' Union of Sydney 
and Siiburbs 
Federated Storemen and 
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Association of Aust., 
N.S.W. Branch. 
Federated Liquor Trades 
Employees' Union 
The Cold Storage and 
Ice Employees' Union 
Gas Employees' Union 
Amalgamated Coachmakers 
Railway Car and Wagon 
Makers, and Wheelwrights' 
Society of N.S.W. 
Wool and Basil Workers' 






















Newcastle Branch, No.4 
of Boilermakers, £ c. 




(Adapted from "A Calendar of Industrial Dislocations", N.S.W. Industrial 
Gazette, Vol. XIII, No. 2, February, 1918, pp. 144-145) 
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APPENDIX I 
Terms of Settlement 
Agreed to by the Unions' Defence Committee and Cabinet on the 8th 
September, 1917. 
1. The Card System, as existing on 1st August, to be continued, and 
at the end of three months a Royal Commission to be appointed to 
enquire into and determine whether its operations are just or other-
wise, and should be continued. 
2. In the operation of the card system every man shall, every day, have 
the opportunity of inspecting and initialling his card relating to 
the previous day's work. 
3. Unions to siibmit full lists of grievances to the Special Commissioner 
for Conciliation appointed under the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1912. 
4. Such of the grievances as raise issues which fall within the juris-
diction of the Court of Industrial Arbitration are to be immediately 
referred by or through the said Commissioner to the Court. 
5. Such of the grievances as raise issues which are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are to be referred by the said Commissioner 
to Cabinet, which will immediately amend the Industrial Arbitration 
Acts so as to give the court jurisdiction over all matters which 
are industrial, but not matters of business management. 
5. The Railway Commissioner is to have discretion in filling all 
vacancies, but in making appointments prior to consideration is to be 
given to the claims of applicants who were in the service of the 
Commissioners on or before 1st August last. 
7. It is mutually understock that work shall be resumed without resent-
ment, and employment offered without vindictiveness. 
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They were formally adopted at mass meetings on the 10th September, 
1917. 
(From J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p.35a) 
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APPENDIX J 
Terms of Settlement re Coal Miners 
Agreed to on the 2nd October, 1917. 
1. The members of the Coal Miners' Federation agree to work with loyal 
workers, and to admit them to membership of the Federation if the 
loyal workers so desire. 
2. Permits under the Amending Coal Mines Regulation Act in future are 
to be issued only in cases of strike. 
3. The Government manager of each of the different collieries shall 
have the right to select labour, but in reinstating the industry he 
shall give prior consideration - subject to the claims of loyal 
workers who desire to remain in the industry - to former employees. 
In selecting labour, the manager shall not bar any man merely on 
account of his being a unionist, or on account of his past connection 
with unionism, or on account of old age, or on account of his 
becoming a slow worker through any legitimate cause. In individual 
cases where the Government has reason to believe that these instruct-
ions have been violated, the Government undertakes to grant an 
inquiry. 
4. In selecting employees in re-starting the mines, the management 
shall show no unfair discrimination, and, siibject to the limitations 
before prescribed, shall observe the rule "last to come, first to go". 
5. The orders made by Mr. Justice Edmunds are to stand during the 
currency of the terms prescribed therein. 
6. Each colliery shall accept a board of conciliation, consisting of a 
representative of the employees and a representative of the management, 
to investigate and determine all minor matters of dispute. In the 
events of these representatives not being able to agree, any matter 
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referred to them shall be settled by a district conciliation 
commissioner, a separate commissioner to be appointed by the Govern-
ment for the Newcastle district, the Maitland district, the Southern 
district, and the Western district. These conciliation committees 
shall deal only with minor matters of dispute, and shall not alter 
in any way the working conditions, the rates of pay, or hours of 
employment which are prescribed for the industry as a whole. 
7. Any future dispute as to an alleged alteration of the established 
customs of different collieries shall be referred to the local 
conciliation committee. But the employees agree that matters relating 
to the method of working the colliery shall be directed by the manage-
ment , and in order to prevent constant minor stoppages of work, the 
Miners' Federation agrees to impose and enforce penalties against 
lodges which strike without reference of the matter in dispute to the 
local conciliation committee. 
8. There shall also be a general conciliation committee for the coal 
trade, consisting of three employees' representatives and three 
representatives of mine proprietors. This committee shall deal with 
disputes general to the industry as a whole, and in the event of its 
being unable to agree on any matters referred to it by the Chief 
Industrial Commissioner, one of the Industrial Judges shall be called 
in to act as umpire. Both parties agree to forget past differences, 
and try to establish the industry on the basis of conciliation and 
arbitration. 
9. All dargs shall be removed, and miners will give such reasonable 
output as they are capable of, but rules will be adopted to provide 
for fair distribution of available skips. 
10. All collieries shall be brought into work again as rapidly as possible. 
The employees undertake that no discrimination will in future be shown 
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in respect of any collieries, and the Government undertakes that as 
many collieries as possible shall be worked. 
11. The employees agree to hold a conference with representatives of the 
Government inside six months to consider whether an arrangement can 
be made to work a second shift on terms satisfactory to both parties. 
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